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BOTTOM-RUNG APPEALS
Merritt E. McAlister*
There are haves and have-nots in the federal appellate courts, and the
haves get more attention. For decades the courts have used a triage regime
where they distribute judicial attention selectively: some appeals receive a
lot of judicial attention, some appeals receive barely any. What this work
unearths is that this triage system produces demonstrably unequal results
depending on the circuit handling the appeal and whether the appellant
has counsel or not. Together, these two factors produce dramatic
disparities: in one circuit, for example, an unrepresented appellant
receives, on average, a decision less than a tenth the length of a similarly
situated represented appellant in another circuit. Compounding that, in
most federal circuits thousands of decisions issued annually in
unrepresented appeals—especially those involving prisoners—are not
available on free court websites, rendering them functionally unusable by
those facing the greatest barriers to accessing justice in federal court.
This Article both unearths these systemic inequities and calls for greater
attention to their consequences. These disparities threaten dignitary
harm to litigants, but they also risk a disparate impact on the
development of the law. The courts and Congress, if need be, should
realign the existing triage regime to prioritize procedural justice values
alongside efficiency. At a minimum, this Article argues for transparency
reforms to better assess the effect of the federal appellate triage regime on
marginalized litigants. More controversially, it also argues that Congress
should establish minimum and uniform standards for federal appellate
decisionmaking.
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INTRODUCTION
The haves come out ahead in the federal appellate courts.
They benefit from a system that, for decades, has distributed
judicial time and attention selectively: some appeals—those
presenting issues deemed sufficiently important—receive lots of
attention; but most appeals—those presenting “easy” or routine
issues—receive hardly any.1 The former usually benefit from oral
argument and robust judicial engagement; the latter receive a
judge’s rubber stamp on an “unpublished”2 decision drafted by
1 See Marin K. Levy, Judicial Attention as a Scarce Resource: A Preliminary
Defense of How Judges Allocate Time Across Cases in the Federal Courts of Appeals, 81
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 401, 443-46 (2013) (concluding that federal appellate case
management practices that distribute judicial attention selectively are “loosely
consistent with . . . the twin goals of error correction and law development”).
2 “Unpublished” decisions are those not designated by the courts for
inclusion in the official West Federal Reporter. The standards that govern
publication decisions, the nomenclature the courts use to describe these
decisions, and public access to them all vary across the circuits. See Rachel
Brown, Jade Ford, Sahrula Kubie, Katrin Marquez, Bennett Ostdiek, & Abbe
R. Gluck, Is Unpublished Unequal? An Empirical Examination of the 87%
Nonpublication Rate in Federal Appeals, 107 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 19-25 (2022)

1
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the central legal staff who read the parties’ briefs. This two-tiered
system of judicial triage self-consciously divides the world of
federal appellate review into “haves” and “have-nots.”3 But we’ve
all been wrong; the world of federal appeals doesn’t just have two
tiers. It has three. There’s a bottom rung.
In some—if not in most—circuits there’s a first tier of review
for counseled appeals involving the most “important” or
interesting cases; there’s a second tier for the system’s “haves”
who have lawyers but present routine, boring, or easy issues; and
there’s a third tier for the system’s “have-nots” who are
unrepresented. Unrepresented appellants, on average, receive
decisions half the length of their represented counterparts—even
controlling for oral argument, outcome, and publication status.
And in some circuits the disparity is even more dramatic: in one
circuit an unrepresented appellant receives a decision that, on
average, is less than a tenth the length of a decision in a similar,
counseled appeal. Making matters worse, thousands of decisions
issued annually in appeals involving unrepresented appellants are
unavailable on free court websites (and, as a result, never make it
to usable commercial databases).
Unrepresented litigants already face great barriers in accessing
justice.4 This work demonstrates just how high those hurdles have
become in the federal appellate courts. Useful law is harder to find
for many unrepresented appellants, and, if it is available, it’s more
likely to be thinly reasoned. It’s also far more likely to be “non-

(discussing circuit practices, rules, and nomenclature related to publication)
[hereinafter Gluck, et al.].
3 See William M. Richman & William L. Reynolds, Elitism, Expediency, and
the New Certiorari: Requiem for the Learned Hand Tradition, 81 CORNELL L. REV.
273, 278 (1996) (describing two-track system of federal appellate justice)
[hereinafter Richman & Reynolds, Elitism]; see also Merritt E. McAlister,
Rebuilding the Federal Circuit Courts, 116 NW. U. L. REV. 1137, 1140 & nn.7-9,
1147-48 (2022) (arguing for “tiers” of federal appellate justice) [hereinafter
McAlister, Rebuilding]; Penelope Pether, Sorcerers, Not Apprentices: How Judicial
Clerks and Staff Attorneys Impoverish U.S. Law, 39 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1, 20 (2007)
(arguing that “have-nots” appellants often receive “second-tier justice” in
federal appellate courts). Although some scholars describe the system as having
two “tracks” (an argument track and a non-argument track), this work uses the
term “tiers” given how value-laden the “tracking” decisions are. See Judith
Resnik, Tiers, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 837, 840-44 (1984) (discussing “value-express
functions” of procedural choices).
4 See, e.g., DEBORAH L. RHODE, ACCESS TO JUSTICE 8 (2004) (“As law
becomes increasingly crucial and complex, access to legal services also becomes
increasingly critical.”); id. at 14-15 (“All too often, parties without lawyers
confront procedures of excessive and bewildering complexity, and forms with
archaic jargon left over from medieval England.”).

2
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precedential” or “unpublished,”5 as well, a decisional status
reserved for decisions that purport, on their face, to make no law
because they break no new ground.6 But this law remains freely
citable as persuasive authority in federal courts,7 and the volume
of unpublished authority substantially dwarfs the precedential
authority courts create.8
These forces combine to threaten systemic underdevelopment of the law in areas where marginalized litigants
litigate the most: prisoner civil rights claims, asylum and other
immigration matters, and habeas corpus law. Moreover, many of
these are also areas of the law that depend, quite literally, on
decisional law to develop and define the contours of
constitutional rights and duties.9 By issuing perfunctory decisions
in civil rights cases, for example, courts are more likely to stymie
efforts to overcome qualified immunity and to thwart the
development of constitutional rights in the modern era.
Procedural shortcuts thus create legal barriers to obtaining relief.
This work makes three main contributions to an emerging
conversation around access-to-justice issues in the federal

5 In 2021, the nationwide rate of unpublished decisions in cases terminated
on the merits (as opposed to cases terminated for procedural reasons) was
86.3%. ADMIN. OFF. OF THE U.S. CTS., JUDICIAL BUSINESS 2021, at tbl.B-12
[hereinafter Judicial Business 2021], https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/
files/data_tables/jb_b12_0930.2021.pdf. That percentage has remained
relatively consistent; the Administrative Office calculates that 87.8% of the
regional circuit courts of appeals’ decisions on the merits were unpublished
between 2015 and 2020. Judicial United States Courts, Table 2.5, U.S. Cts. (2020),
https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/data_tables/jff_2.5_0930.2020
.pdf. I rely heavily on data from several issues of Judicial Business in this Article,
which for convenience are cited simply as “JUDICIAL BUSINESS [year],” with a
hyperlink to each table the first time it appears. For all reports, see Judicial
Business
of
the
United
States
Courts,
U.S.
CTS.,
https://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/analysis-reports/judicialbusiness-united-states-courts. Note that the reporting period for the
Administrative Office’s Judicial Business publication runs from October 1 to
September 30 each year. Id.
6 See Gluck, et al., supra note 2, at 37 (concluding that “the federal judiciary
is disproportionately and systematically not publishing cases brought by certain
types of litigants-namely litigants representing themselves and incarcerated
individuals”).
7 FED. R. APP. P. 32.1.
8 See supra note 5 (observing that approximately 87% of federal appellate
merits decisions are unpublished).
9 See Alan M. Trammell, The Constitutionality of Nationwide Injunctions, 91 U.
COLO. L. REV. 977, 989 (2020) (recognizing that “precedents create affirmative
legal obligations for state officials, even if those officials were not parties to the
precedent-making lawsuits”).

3
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appellate courts.10 First, it demonstrates that not all unpublished
decisions—the most common type of federal appellate decision,
by far—are created equal. There’s a bottom rung of federal
appellate justice for unrepresented appellants in most circuits.
Using a unique dataset containing more than 11,000 hand-coded
decisions issued by every geographic federal appellate court
during a continuous six-month period,11 this Article demonstrates
that decisions in unrepresented appeals are, on average, about half
the length of decisions in counseled appeals when controlling for
publication status, outcome, and oral argument.
Second, this work proves that not all unpublished decisions
are equally accessible, and this disparity, likewise, affects
unrepresented litigants more than represented ones. Thousands
of decisions issued by federal appellate courts on the merits
during the study period are unavailable on the commercial
database this study used. That finding builds on my earlier work
revealing the existence of “missing” unpublished decisions from
free court websites and commercial databases.12 These decisions,
instead, remain locked away behind the federal docketing system’s
paywall, and thus out of easy reach of litigants and the commercial
databases who use free court websites to access them.13 This work
offers the first detailed analysis of what is missing across all

10 This Article builds on a recent study on unpublished decisions from
Abbe Gluck and colleagues. See generally Gluck, et al., supra note 2; see also infra
Part II.C.2 (situating this project in the context of other studies).
11 Because of its unique jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1295, this project excludes
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. But its decisional practices
are certainly worthy of examination. See, e.g., Paul R. Gugliuzza & Mark A.
Lemley, Can a Court Change the Law by Saying Nothing?, 71 VAND. L. REV. 765
(2018) (examining Federal Circuit’s use of summary affirmances in decisions
involving patentable subject matter); Jason Rantanen, Missing Decisions and
the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, 170 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE
73 (2022) (discussing failure of Federal Circuit to make certain decisions
available on its website—in particular, decisions related to the appropriateness
of an appeal and mandamus decisions).
12 See Merritt E. McAlister, Missing Decisions, 169 U. PA. L. REV. 1101, 1103
(2021) (demonstrating that “approximately twenty-seven percent [of merits
terminations] are missing from the most popular and powerful commercial
legal databases”) [hereinafter McAlister, Missing]; see also Gluck, et al., supra note
2, at 10 (“we found that court websites and commercial databases contained
only limited subsets of all unpublished opinions, limiting the empirical study
that could be undertaken” and noting that “recent study by McAlister confirms
that commercial databases are indeed missing a significant share of federal
appellate dispositions”).
13 See McAlister, Missing, supra note 12, at 1105 (explaining that because
commercial databases depend on free court websites for most of their content,
they are unlikely to obtain merits decisions not available there (unless requested
by a database user)); id. at 1138-40 (describing in detail how certain
“judgments” are locked behind the First Circuit’s docketing paywall).

4
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geographic circuits. Here, that’s more than 5,000 reasoned
decisions, and 85% of those decisions involve marginalized
litigants (including incarcerated persons, criminal defendants, and
those without lawful or permanent status in the United States).
Not only is there a bottom rung of federal appeals, but it’s also
harder for the litigants the courts shunt there to find and use
relevant law.
Third, this Article demonstrates that not all federal appellate
courts are created equal, either. Decisional practices or habits
across the circuits vary widely, risking the uneven development of
the law in different regions and imposing differential dignitary
harms on marginalized litigants. Disparities over the use of
unpublished decisions across the circuits are well known.14 But
this work is the first to demonstrate that it’s not just the rates of
publication that vary, but the extent of reason-giving itself.
Assessing outcomes by decision length, the litigant experience
(especially for unrepresented litigants) varies dramatically across
the circuits—sometimes by as much as a factor of ten.
While some scholars have celebrated certain forms of disuniformity across the federal appellate courts as valuable “circuit
personalities,”15 this work identifies more pernicious circuit
habits. These entrenched practices are cause for reform, I argue,
not celebration. Indeed, they demonstrate the failure of the courts
to oversee and evaluate the effects of their triage regime on the
vulnerable litigants who frequently seek redress in the federal
appellate courts.16 At a minimum, this work calls on Congress to
mandate transparency reforms to enable courts, scholars, and the
public to better assess the disparities the triage system produces.
More controversially, it also argues for a congressionally
mandated minimum reason-giving requirement for all nonfrivolous federal appeals.

14 See McAlister, Rebuilding, supra note 3, at 1178-79 (discussing disparities
across circuits in rates of oral argument and publication); Merritt E. McAlister,
“Downright Indifference”: Examining Unpublished Decisions in the Federal Courts of
Appeals, 118 MICH. L. REV. 533 (2020) (discussing differences in circuit
publication practices).
15 See generally Allison Orr Larsen & Neal Devins, Circuit Personalities, 108
VA. L. REV. ___ (forthcoming 2022), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=4035789 (arguing that circuits have unique
personalities that are important counterweights to increased judicial
partisanship).
16 Pro se or unrepresented appellants account for nearly half of all appeals
in the federal appellate courts. JUDICIAL BUSINESS 2021 tbl.B-9 (pro se appeals
account for nearly half of all appeals commenced and terminated (21,423 of
44,546 or 48% of proceedings commenced and 23,452 of 47,748 or 49% of
proceedings terminated).

5
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This Article has three parts. It begins with a discussion of the
current federal appellate triage regime, which, broadly speaking,
generates two tiers of federal appellate review: one for argued
cases and one for non-argued cases. That discussion focuses
largely on the costs and benefits of this regime—for the courts,
the litigants, and the public. The next part is the Article’s primary,
descriptive contribution: it discusses the results of a study of more
than 11,000 merits terminations from across the geographic
federal appellate courts during a six-month period. This work
demonstrates that controlling for outcome, publication status,
and oral argument, unrepresented litigants receive decisions
approximately half the length of similarly situated others. Further,
appeals involving incarcerated persons are far more likely to be
missing from commercial databases than other categories of civil
appeals. The final part considers why these results matter—both
as a matter of distributive justice and law development. The
federal appellate regime is a system of haves and have nots, and
that reality harms litigants and the law alike. Ultimately, these
disparities, and the risks for dignitary harms and legal underdevelopment they create, are reasons for reform, including
imposing a uniform reason-giving mandate across the federal
appellate courts.
I. THE BENEFITS AND COSTS OF
FEDERAL APPELLATE TRIAGE
The two “tiers”17—or, more neutrally, the two “tracks”18—of
federal appellate process are well established: in every appellate
court, there’s a nonargument track and an argument track.19 Cases
17 See Pether, supra note 3, at 20 (arguing that federal appellate courts
provide “second-tier justice” to some); see also McAlister, Rebuilding, supra note
3, at 1140 & nn.7-9, 1147-48 (describing “tiers” of federal appellate justice).
18 WILLIAM M. RICHMAN & WILLIAM L. REYNOLDS, INJUSTICE ON
APPEAL: THE UNITED STATES COURTS OF APPEALS IN CRISIS 110 (2013)
(discussing development of “two completely separate tracks for justice” in the
federal appellate courts over past half-century) [hereinafter RICHMAN &
REYNOLDS, INJUSTICE]. For a more thorough discussion of the history and
development of these tracks for federal appellate review, William Richman and
William Reynolds’ work is invaluable.
19 See generally RICHMAN & REYNOLDS, INJUSTICE, supra note 18; Marin K.
Levy, The Mechanics of Federal Appeals: Uniformity and Case Management in the Circuit
Courts, 61 DUKE L.J. 315 (2011) [hereinafter Levy, Mechanics]; see also David C.
Vladeck & Mitu Gulati, Judicial Triage: Reflections on the Debate Over Unpublished
Opinions, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1667, 1668 (2005) (“To manage their
burgeoning caseloads, courts have increasingly resorted to docket-management
tools that have resulted in a bifurcation of how cases are considered and
resolved by federal appeals courts. . . . There are now two separate and
unequally tracks by which cases are considered and resolved in our federal
appellate courts.”); Lauren K. Robel, Caseload and Judging: Judicial Adaptations to

6
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resolved using the former process commonly result in
unpublished decisions20 authored primarily (but not exclusively)21
by central staff attorneys hired and overseen by central legal
staff.22 Judges sign off on these decisions, but the urge to
rubberstamp them may be, in the words of one judge, “great.”23
This second-tier process permits courts to handle a substantial
volume of routine matters and other low-value24 or easy work by
outsourcing its resolution mostly to other, non-judicial
decisionmakers. Meanwhile, more complex or “important” cases
receive first-tier review: they go to oral argument, end more
frequently in published decisions, and receive more judicial
attention.25

Caseload, 1990 BYU L. REV. 3, 58 (observing that courts focus on “elite cases”
and not “ordinary” ones). But see Ryan W. Copus, Statistical Precedent: Allocating
Judicial Attention, 73 VAND. L. REV. 605, 613 (2020) (arguing that there are not
only two tracks but “a sprawling, multilevel system of review” that includes
“lower court and agency decisions . . . but also staff attorney, law clerk, and
panel decisions”).
20 Levy, Mechanics, supra note 19, at 346.
21 These procedures are not uniform, and there are different triage regimes
and screening practices within the circuits. For a more detailed discussion
across the circuits, see Levy, Mechanics, supra note 19, and RICHARD A. POSNER,
REFORMING THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY: MY FORMER COURT NEEDS TO
OVERHAUL ITS STAFF ATTORNEY PROGRAM AND BEGIN TELEVISING ITS
ORAL ARGUMENTS 49-61 (2017) [hereinafter POSNER, REFORMING].
22 See McAlister, Rebuilding, supra note 3, at 1156-59 (discussing
development of staff attorney program and key differences between staff
attorneys and law clerks); see also Richman & Reynolds, Elitism, supra note 3, at
275 (“[T]he judge is now the manager of a staff, whose primary role is to
conserve judicial effort by screening cases and participating significantly in the
decision making process.”)
23 See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CHALLENGE AND
REFORM 162 (1996) (“The tendency to sign on the dotted line with little real
consideration of the case [in those handled by staff attorneys] must be great.”).
24 See Judith Resnik, Housekeeping: The Nature and Allocation of Work in Federal
Trial Courts, 24 GA. L. REV. 909, 913 (1990) (considering expressive effect of
labeling certain work “worthy [of] Article III judges” and other work not).
25 See Richman & Reynolds, Elitism, supra note 3, at 278 (describing
traditional, first-tier appellate practice as “the Learned Hand model,” which
includes “[o]ral argument,” “a thorough discussion among the judges in a faceto-face conference, one panel member prepares a draft opinion, circulates the
opinion among the panel, and then revises the draft in response to their
comments”; further, the judge writes the opinion him or herself, using a “law
clerk as a research tool and sounding board”; when the panel agrees, “it is
published in a reporter accessible to everyone”).

7
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Judges themselves26 innovated what is now described as an
appellate “triage” system,27 where judges “lavish attention” on
some appeals and spend only “a few minutes” on others.28 The
courts, and scholars, largely defended these procedural
innovations—the development of unpublished decisions,29 the
reduction in oral argument,30 and the use of staff attorneys31—as
needed responses to caseload demands.32 Because judicial

RICHMAN & REYNOLDS, INJUSTICE, supra note 18, at 115 (describing
procedural innovations by federal appellate courts as occurring
“unilateral[ly]”).
27 See, e.g., Vladeck & Gulati, supra note 19, 1673; see also Copus, supra note
16, at 610 (describing “ad hoc triage system” in federal appellate courts).
28 RICHMAN & REYNOLDS, INJUSTICE, supra note 18, at ix, xii.
29 Literature critical of unpublished decisions is rich, vast, and varied, and
mostly beyond the scope of this work. See, e.g., Elizabeth Earle Beske, Rethinking
the Nonprecedential Opinion, 65 UCLA L. REV. 808 (2018) (arguing that some
unpublished decisions violate retroactivity principles); Richard B. Cappalli, The
Common Law’s Case Against Non-Precedential Opinions, 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 755
(2003) (arguing that unpublished decisions violate common-law
decisionmaking principles); Martha J. Dragich, Will the Federal Courts of Appeals
Perish if They Publish? Or Does the Declining Use of Opinions to Explain and Justify
Judicial Decisions Pose a Greater Threat?, 44 AM. U. L. REV. 757 (1995) (arguing
unpublished decisions threaten stare decisis principles); Richman & Reynolds,
Elitism, supra 3, at 275 (arguing unpublished decisions violate judicial norms);
see also Gluck, et al., supra note 2, at 26-35 (discussing non-publication in the
debate over access to justice and collecting sources).
30 This topic, too, is the focus of its own scholarly critique. See, e.g., David
R. Cleveland & Steven Wisotsky, The Decline in Oral Argument in the Federal Courts
of Appeals: A Modest Proposal for Reform, 13 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 119 (2012);
John B. Oakley, The Screening of Appeals: The Ninth Circuit’s Experieince in the
Eighties and Innovations for the Nineties, 1991 B.Y.U. L. REV. 859; Robert J.
Martineau, The Value of Appellate Oral Argument: A Challenge to Conventional
Wisdom, 72 IOWA L. REV. 1, 3 (1986);
31 All three are constituent parts of the procedural triage regime the courts
developed to tackle their caseload demands. See McAlister, Rebuilding, supra note
3, at 1147-63 (discussing development of federal appellate triage system and its
constituent parts).
32 See POSNER, FEDERAL COURTS, supra note 23, at 168-69 (“Given the
workload of the federal courts of appeals today, the realistic choice is not
between limited publication, on the one hand, and, on the other, improving
and then publishing all the opinion that are not published today; it is . . .
between giving the parties reasons for the decision . . . and not”); Levy, Judicial
Attention, supra note 1, at 443-46 (concluding that appellate case management
practices are “loosely consistent with . . . the twin goals of error correction and
law development”); Jon O. Newman, The Second Circuit’s Expedited Adjudication
of Asylum Cases: A Case Study of a Judicial Response to an Unprecedented Problem of
Caseload Management, 74 BROOK. L. REV. 429, 437 (2008) (explaining that
Second Circuit’s use of a non-argument track is “fair[], effective[], and
efficient[]”); Boyce F. Martin, Jr., In Defense of Unpublished Opinions, 60
OHIO ST. L.J. 177, 178-79 (1999) (arguing that unpublished decisions are
“necessary, and not necessarily evil, part of the job”); see also Douglas A.
Berman & Jeffrey O. Cooper, In Defense of Less Precedential Opinions: A Reply to
Chief Judge Martin, 60 OHIO ST. L. J. 2025, 2025-26 (1999) (agreeing that
26
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appointments did not keep pace with rising caseload volume,33 the
courts were forced to innovate ways to maintain a handle on rising
caseload while minimizing delay.34
This Part considers the attendant advantages and
disadvantages that accompany the modern federal appellate triage
regime. Undoubtedly, these reforms reflect some needed
evolution in the traditional appellate process. Not every appeal
may demand the same level of attention from the courts. But the
benefits of these reforms may not outweigh their costs—or, at
least, those costs may call for a recalibration of the system itself.
We already know, for example, that caseload pressures, triage
reform, or some combination thereof has reduced reversal rates
across the federal appeals courts.35 No costs may be weightier
than the possibility that error goes undetected, but there are still
other, systemic costs that federal appellate triage imposes—
especially from a distributive or procedural justice perspective.
This Part considers those tradeoffs.
A. The Benefits
Where resources are limited, a “procedural triage” regime
operates to ensure the most efficient distribution of resources:
more attention where it is needed most—based on whatever
values one seeks to maximize—and less attention where it is
needed least—again, based on the values one seeks to maximize.36

unpublished decisions “play an important, even a necessary role in the
workings of the courts of appeals” but arguing that such decisions might also
permit legal innovation and experimentation in circuit courts).
33 See McAlister, Rebuilding, supra note 3, at 1148-49 (explaining that
whereas caseload grew by 900% between 1960 and 1988, authorized judgeships
increased only from 68 to 167 or by 245%) (citations omitted).
34 There was another, obvious response: to ask Congress for more judges,
a topic that Reynolds and Richman have discussed at length. See Richman &
Reynolds, Elitism, supra note 3, at 277 (explaining that triage “transformation
was not inevitable” but, rather, the result of “[t]he Judicial Establishment . . .
steadfastly resist[ing] the one obvious solution: to ask Congress for a radical
increase in the number of judges”).
35 See generally Bert I. Huang, Lightened Scrutiny, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1109
(2011) (demonstrating causal link between caseload demands or judicial
burdens and outcomes on appeal); see also Cathy Catterson, Changes in Appellate
Caseload and Its Processing, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 287, 289 (2006) (identifying a decline
in reversal rates from 1945 to 2005, where rate dropped from nearly 28%
nationwide to 9% nationwide while case numbers rose dramatically); see also
John J. Gibbons, Illuminating the Invisible Court of Appeals, 19 SETON HALL L.
REV. 484, 487 (1989) (questioning “quality of the superviosion which courts of
appeals are supposed to be exercising over [lower] courts, given that “reversal
rates . . . have declined markedly in recent times”).
36 See Matthew B. Lawrence, Procedural Triage, 84 FORD. L. REV. 79 (2015)
(introducing concept of “procedural triage,” whereby administrative agency

9

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4211611

91 FORDHAM L. REV. ___ (forthcoming 2023)
In medicine, where “triage” regimes may be most familiar,
doctors sort and allocate treatment to maximize survivors.37
Judges, however, have developed the federal appellate triage
regime without being particularly explicit about what values they
have sought to maximize. For example, as one court explained:
“[A]ppellate courts certainly have the inherent authority to
allocate scarce judicial resources among the petitions and appeals
that press for their attention, and such allocations become
especially necessary in this era of burgeoning appellate dockets.”38
But the question of allocation presupposes that institutional
design choices have been undertaken to maximize something.39
The features of the second-tier process or nonargument track
all redound to time-savings for the courts. Opinion writing, for
example, is one of the most time-intensive exercises for judges.40
If that work can be outsourced to others, as it often is in the
context of unpublished decisions issued without oral argument,41
the time-savings is even greater. Second-tier cases conserve
judicial resources for first-tier cases; that’s how the system’s been
designed. The less time that judges must spend on second-tier
cases, presumably the better—and the better, as well, if the triage
decision itself is made by another actor (or happens by default
rule).42 Only in one circuit—perhaps not coincidentally, the least

“ration[s] process among claimants based on the inherent value of participation
to particular claimants”); see id. at 83 n.11 (defining “‘procedural triage’ to
describe . . . proposal to sift among claimants in distributing procedural
protections based on their capacity to derive inherent benefit from those
protections”).
37 Id. at 83 n.11 (quoting Merriam-Webster Dictionary (11th ed. 2014)); see
also Katharyn Kennedy, Richard V. Aghababian, Lucille Gans & C. Phuli Lewis,
Triage: Techniques and Applications in Decisionmaking, 28 ANNALS EMERGENCY
MED. 136, 138 (1996) (describing triage regimes across multiple contexts).
38 Pillay v. I.N.S., 45 F. 3d 14, 17 (2d Cir. 1995) (per curiam).
39 See Levy, Judicial Attention, supra note 1, at 422 (recognizing that setting
a “baseline” in evaluating how judges allocate decision is “challenging to
frame” and observing, further, that “it is difficult to identify what variables
should be maximized” and to measure those variables maximized”).
40 Although surely an outlier, one federal judge observed that opinion
drafting sometimes involves 20 or 30 or as many as 60 drafts. Alex Kozinski,
Essay, Confessions of a Bad Apple, 100 YALE L.J. 1707, 1711 n.9 (1991). That
unpublished decisions “significantly enhance[] the court’s productivity” is wellrecognized. Martin, supra note 32, at 190.
41 See Gluck, et al., supra note 2, at 106 & n.408 (recognizing that “judges
can also reduce their drafting time to the extent they limit their reason-giving
or rely on staff attorneys to submit drafts for their approval and noting that
staff attorneys are at least “sometimes involved in drafting unpublished
opinions).
42 In most circuits, this is the case. See POSNER, REFORMING, supra note
21, at 49-61, 162-65 (discussing how circuits use their staff attorneys’ offices);
see also Levy, Mechanics, supra note 19, at 333-39 (discussing screening or triage
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busy circuit—do judges make the triage decisions themselves and
decline to send certain classes of appeals to staff by default.43
In the most comprehensive and forceful defense of the
federal appellate triage regime, Marin K. Levy has argued that the
federal appellate courts use these case management practices to
allocate judicial attention to maximize two outputs: “error
correction and law development.”44 Levy recognizes that one
could use a procedural system to further other objectives,45 and
by those measures, the federal appellate regime may be less
successful. But Levy has argued that the current system
“comports fairly well with an attempt by the courts to maximize
their error-correction and law-development functions with their
limited resources.”46 What works, she suggests, is the basic triage
framework that identifies certain “complex” cases with “novel
issues” for “argument and consideration in chambers,” while
“separat[ing] certain kinds of cases—repeating appeals, patently
frivolous appeals, and those that have received at least one
meaningful review”—for less judicial attention.47 Levy argues for
improvements to “facilitate the identification of those traditional
nonargument cases that require full judicial attention,” but she
concedes the rationality of sorting cases—even by default rules—

procedures in D.C., First, Second, Third, and Fourth Circuits). Third Circuit
judges actively screen cases for oral argument, id. at 371, but the court screens
unrepresented cases and most immigration cases to nonargument panels by
default, id. at 351.
43 See McAlister, Rebuilding, supra note 3, at 1160-61 (discussing triage
schemes and identifying Tenth Circuit as the only circuit that “appears not to
rely on central staff to screen appeals or handle certain classes of appeals by
default” and observing further that “the Tenth Circuit is the least busy of the
geographic circuit courts”).
44 Levy, Judicial Attention, supra note 1, at 405-06. And, of course, as Levy
observes, there’s a good deal of literature that suggests these are two functions
the appellate courts have been designed to do. See id. at 424-25 nn.140-44
(citing, among others, KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION:
DECIDING APPEALS 12-13 (1969); ROSCOE POUND, APPELLATE PROCEDURE
IN CIVIL CASES 3 (1941); DANIEL JOHN MEADOR, APPELLATE COURTS IN THE
UNITED STATES 3 (2d ed. 2006)).
45 See id. at 425-26 (recognizing “alternative objectives” for appellate
system, including those arguably subsumed within error correction and law
development, as well as those independent of them, like legitimacy and
constraining costs).
46 Id. at 406.
47 Id. at 435; see also K.K. DuVivier, Are Some Words Better Left Unpublished?:
Precedent and the Role of Unpublished Decisions, 3 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 397, 418
(2001) (concluding that “some decisions do have the potential to play a more
significant role in shaping future decisions” and that “[c]ourts should be
permitted to spend additional time in producing these decisions” and to weigh
them more heavily as precedent).
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“based on characteristics of the claims and not the status of the
parties.”48
What emerges from Levy’s work is that the primary benefit of
the current regime is efficiency.49 The triage regime, in Levy’s
view, both rationally and efficiently allocates the scarcest judicial
resource—that is, judicial attention—to produce desired
outputs—again, error correction and law development. Ryan
Copus’s recent work suggests there’s a mechanism for Pareto
optimization50 of Levy’s framework: his is a proof of concept that
machine learning could generate a better triage system that more
accurately identifies cases that need more attention (assuming,
again, that error correction and law development are the triage
system’s optimal outputs).51 Copus would replace default triage
rules—driven, often, about presumptions around the relative
merits of certain types of appeals (like those by unrepresented
parties)—in favor of a more complex algorithmic triage regime
that predicts “degree of error” and “degree of instability” to better
allocate judicial attention.52 Copus may have built a better
mousetrap—or at least produced a blueprint for doing so—but
his proposal likewise values efficient distribution of error
correction and law development above other values.
That efficiency emerges as the prime benefit of the triage
system is no surprise.53 The triage regime is perhaps the federal
48 Levy, Judicial Attention, supra note 1, at 440. Those characteristics include
frivolity and repeated claims, among others. Id. at 438-39.
49 “Efficiency,” of course, is itself “chameleon-like,” but it is nevertheless
the animating force behind the triage regime. Joseph Sanders, Road Signs and the
Goals of Justice, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1297, 1297 n.4 (1987).
50 Under Pareto theory, “[a] legal rule is efficient if it induces people to
behave in such a way that no one can be made better off (in terms of [his or]
her own preferences) without making someone else worse off.” Lewis A.
Kornhauser, An Introduction to the Economic Analysis of Contract Remedies, 57 U.
COLO. L. REV. 683, 688-89 (1986).
51 See Copus, supra note 19, at 624-625 (identifying Levy’s framework as
“conceptual foundation” for use of “statistical precedent”—that is, a machinelearning tool that identifies more systematically cases that would benefit from
more judicial attention based on likely need for error correction or law
development).
52 Id. at 613; see id. at 654 (explaining there is “little justification” for
assigning high-error rate pro se appeals to staff attorneys by default and
observing that “10% of civil pro se appeals have error estimates that place them
within the range of other civil cases”).
53 See RICHMAN & REYNOLDS, INJUSTICE, supra note 18 at 115 (“[The
Appellate Triage Regime] ha[s] certainly helped the courts process appeals in a
timely fashion. Dispositions per judge have increased dramatically over the past
thirty years, and the number of pending appeals is small. Limited publication,
central staff, and reduced oral argument have done what they were supposed
to; the trains do run on time.”); see also Brian Soucek, Copy-Paste Precedent, 13 J.
APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 153, 164-65 (2012) (“Unpublished opinions are an
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appellate system’s embodiment of federal judges’ contemporary
managerial stance.54 In her pathbreaking work on “managerial
judging,” Judith Resnik has argued that, among others, efficiency
concerns—or, rather, inefficiency concerns—propelled courts to
innovate “systems management as the solution.”55 Richman and
Reynolds have made a similar point about the appellate triage
regime: they argue that “[j]udges on the federal courts of appeals
now run something that resembles an office in a large law firm.”56
These managerial reforms concentrated judicial power, permitting
judges to play “a critical role in shaping litigation and influencing
results.”57 Judges wield managerial powers “beyond the public
view, off the record, with no obligation to provide written,
reasoned opinions”—a process that, according to Resnik, “may
be redefining sub silentio our standard of what constitutes rational,
fair, and impartial adjudication.”58
The triage regime’s efficiency boon is usually described as
conveying benefits for the courts, the public, and the
development of law alike. We suppose that courts should issue
decisions more quickly, and that litigants might prefer such a
system to one where judicial review takes more time.59 Likewise,
we presume that the public benefits from judicial curation—that
is, that not all decisions should have “precedential” status because
that both clutters the Federal Reporter and makes governing law
more difficult to find.60 The triage system itself is a way for the
court to convey useful information to the public: pay attention to
this decision because we did (because we gave it oral argument
and published treatment) and don’t pay attention to this decision

efficiency mechanism—a way of dispensing more quickly with cases that
supposedly break no new legal ground.”).
54 See Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374, 380 (1982)
(“judicial management may be teaching judges to value their statistics, such as
number of case dispositions, more than they value the quality of their
dispositions”) [hereinafter Resnik, Managerial].
55 Id. at 398-99.
56 RICHMAN & REYNOLDS, INJUSTICE, supra note 18, at 115.
57 Resnik, Managerial, supra note 54, at 379.
58 Id. at 380.
59 See, e.g., William H. Pryor, Jr., Conservatives Should Oppose Expanding the
Federal
Courts,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Nov.
29,
2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/29/opinion/conservatives-expandingfederal-courts.html (federal appellate judge arguing that litigants would prefer
“routine cases based on settled precent” should not be “delay[ed]”).
60 See, e.g., William L. Reynolds & William M. Richman, The Non-Precedential
Precedent—Limited Publication and No-Citation Rules in the United States Courts of
Appeals, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 1167, 1168-69 (1978) (explaining that concerns
over the growing volume of decisional law was one reason for the courts to
innovate unpublished decisions) [hereinafter Reynolds & Richman, NonPrecedential].
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(because we didn’t). It serves as a signal for what matters, or what
should matter, and litigants take heed. A recent study from Abbe
Gluck and a team of colleagues, for example, demonstrates that
litigants infrequently cite to unpublished decisions (compared to
published adjudications).61 Whether that’s because they are,
overall, unhelpful on their face or simply duplicative of wellestablished principles in published opinions is difficult to know,
however. And the fact that some unpublished decisions have been
cited more than a hundred times, as the Gluck team finds,62
suggests that courts aren’t always good at predicting the need for
precedent63—a suggestion that triage sometimes fails at providing
needed law-development.
Even if we recognize that the triage regime preserves scarce
judicial resources in a rational way—that is, that it is an efficient
system or something close to it—that assessment, itself, carries
value-laden judgments.64 That efficiency might be the primary
boon of the triage system is itself an assertion about “the
relationship between the aggregate benefits of [the] situation and
the aggregate costs of the situation.”65 That is to say that
embedded within claims about efficiency are claims about what
the system should be designed to achieve—claims that are
contested and competing. The system is only efficient in so far as
it permits judges to spend time on the cases they deem most
“important,” in whatever way they define importance. That
appraisal of importance may center, as Levy argues, on error
correction and law development.66 But what if what’s
“important”—and thus what the triage system enables judges to

Gluck, et al., supra note 2, at 85-88 (discussing citation practices related
to unpublished decisions in appellate decisions and appellate briefs).
62 See id. at 88 & n.336 (discussing of citation of certain unpublished
decisions more than a hundred times).
63 Reynolds & Richman, Non-Precedential, supra note 60, at 1191-94 (arguing
that judges have a hard time predicting accurately when precedential decisions
are needed and when they are not).
64 See Neil H. Buchanan & Michael C. Dorf, A Tale of Two Formalisms: How
Law and Economics Mirrors Originalism and Textualism, 106 CORNELL L. REV. 590,
609 (2021) (arguing that “efficiency” in law and economics is “incoherent”
because “where one starts as a baseline determines what counts as efficient and
inefficient”); see also Brooke D. Coleman, The Efficiency Norm, 56 B.C. L. REV.
1777, 1797 (2015) (noting that “[h]ow one measures ‘costs’ and ‘benefits’
necessarily turns on an evaluative judgment about what is a benefit and what is
a cost,” which is “inevitably subjective”).
65 See Coleman, supra note 64, at 1796 & n. 118(quoting A. Mitchell
Polinsky, An Introduction to Law and Economics 7-11 (4th Ed. 2011)); id. at
1796 (asserting that quote is “efficiency” “at its most basic level”).
66 Levy, Judicial Attention, supra note 1, at 406.
61
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prioritize—is just what a particular judge finds interesting?67 Is
such a system still efficient, if the benefits it serves are primarily
personal to the judge (and where public benefits may be
secondary)? What if we’ve just grown accustomed to the
distortions that triaging produce? For example, we expect
unrepresented cases to be meritless because the law has developed
more slowly in those areas where unrepresented appellants litigate
most; that those cases are perceived as repetitious and meritless
thus only propels the seeming rationality of the triage regime.
Moreover, the view that the system efficiently serves the ends
of error correction and law development depends on one’s view
of how much risk of error to tolerate (and in what kinds of cases)
and how much law development is optimal. Take, for example,
law development. It’s conceivable that too much triage—and,
indeed, too much triage for certain kinds of cases (like prisoner
litigation)—may lead to the under-development of the law in
certain areas.68 Depending on one’s view, that may create
inefficiencies, because it requires courts to resolve more disputes
in areas of the law where rights and duties could have been better
developed to give all parties sufficient notice.69 This is a
particularly great risk given what this work reveals about decisions
missing from commercial databases and court websites. Where
unpublished decisions are not just non-precedential, but also
unfindable, one might argue the system is quite inefficient in
developing useful legal rules (to say nothing of other values like
transparency, equality, and dignity).70 Unpublished decisions are

67 See Mitu Gulati & C.M.A. McCauliff, On Not Making Law, 61 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 157, 190 (1998) (“To the extent that the judges share a
distaste for a particular area [the examples given are “veteran’s benefits or
prisoners’ rights cases”], the availability of the [summary disposition] can mean
that the hard cases in these areas will receive less attention and the case law will
be underdeveloped. . . . The availability of the [summary disposition] distorts
the development of the law toward areas that judges enjoy.”).
68 The Gluck Study confirms this risk. See Gluck, et al., supra note 2, at 38
(asserting that “certain areas of the law may be developing more slowly and
less broadly because they are deprived of precedential, reasoned opinions” and
“these areas of the law correlate with claims brought by disempowered
litigants”).
69 See David R. Cleveland, Clear as Mud: How the Uncertain Precedential Status
of Unpublished Opinions Muddles Qualified Immunity Determinations, 65 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 45, 50 (2015) (arguing that [t]he inclusion or exclusion of unpublished
opinions as evidence of clearly established law [in the qualified immunity
context] may alter the ‘contours of the right’ and the clarity with which an
official would understand that the right has been violated”).
70 Cf. Nancy Gertner, Loser’s Rules, 122 YALE L.J. ONLINE 109, 110, 123
(2012) (recognizing distortion effect where judges write “more detailed
decisions when granting summary judgment” and not when denying it);
Elizabeth Y. McCuskey, Submerged Precedent, 16 NEV. L.J. 515, 516-17 (2016)
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still useful law;71 indeed, in areas where litigants frequently lose,
they may be even more useful as clear signals of what arguments
have been tried before and have failed (perhaps even repeatedly).
Similarly, we tolerate some risk that error goes undetected
whenever courts relegate certain types of appeals to a second-tier
process by operation of default rules. For example, Levy has
argued that some appeals may categorically involve lower risk of
error because they’ve already been subject to an additional layer
of review or because they involve straight-forward issues
commonly seen (immigration and Social Security matters, for
example).72 That’s hardly true for all cases relegated to second-tier
process by default. Levy acknowledges that unrepresented appeals
do not neatly fit those categories for low error risk,73 even though
some unrepresented prisoner claims may be “repeating claims,”
which are common claims arising from well-developed law.74 The
decision to screen these appeals to a nonargument track by default
may rest on the courts’ view that they involve “a higher
percentage of frivolous claims” than other civil, represented
appeals.75 But that is, itself, a subjective assessment—one that may
be just as influenced by bias against incarcerated litigants as it is
rooted in reality. The reversal rate in all civil appeals is still quite
low,76 and Copus’s recent work underscores that “while ‘pro se’ is
not an awful proxy for low merit, it is far from perfect.”77
Nevertheless, it’s largely the proxy that fuels the current triage
regime—perhaps, partly, because it’s efficient to administer (a
binary choice) and results in the default screening of nearly half

(arguing that unavailability of district court decisions on commercial databases
“obscur[es] decisional law” and “undermine[s]” core values of “fairness,
efficacy, and legitimacy”).
71 See generally McCuskey, supra note 70 (arguing for a capacious view of
precedent where district court decisions, which are never precedential, are
useful as precedent).
72 See Levy, Judicial Attention, supra note 1, at 432-33 & n.177 (discussing
rationality of screening immigration matters, Social Security matters, and unfair
labor practices claims to a non-argument track because they involve issues
commonly seen by the courts or issues that have already been reviewed by
multiple decision-makers or both).
73 Id. at 436.
74 Id. at 437.
75 Id. at 438.
76 JUDICIAL BUSINESS 2021 tbl.B-5 (national average reversal rate is 8.7%;
the reversal rate for federal prisoner litigation is 4.9%; the reversal rate for nonfederal prisoner litigation is 4.0%; and the reversal rate for civil matters not
involving the federal government is 11.7%).
77 Copus, supra note 19, at 654.
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of all filed appeals.78 Efficiency spurred and continues to propel
the triage regime.
Finally, the triage system’s efficiency calculus and the
tradeoffs it entails may change over time, but the system’s pathdependency may make such re-evaluations difficult. Decades of
reform have created institutional beuraucracy that supports and
perpetuates triage. And the system seems largely impervious onthe-ground changes. For example, the need for unpublished
decisions—as a time-savings device—appears to have lessened
over time: courts receive more than 20,000 fewer appeals today
than they did at the caseload zenith in 2005,79 yet the
nonpublication rate is approximately 5% higher today than it was
then.80 The justification for the use of unpublished decisions—a
crushing workload—has weakened over time. Judges still have
lots of work, to be sure, but they also have more help to do it. Yet
they continue to rely on procedural and decisional shortcuts at
very high rates. The reason surely has something to do with a
certain amount of path-dependence: now that the operations for
triage and procedural shortcuts are firmly in place, there’s little
incentive to re-align circuit priorities as workload reduces.81 The
courts have redefined our expectations for federal appellate
process—and perhaps not always for the better. I turn next to
consider some of the costs of these reforms.
B. The Costs
Just like its purported benefits, the triage regime’s potential
costs are subjective and difficult to quantify. An appraisal of cost
necessarily privileges a certain view of the tirage regime’s goals

JUDICIAL BUSINESS 2021 tbl.B-9 (pro se appeals account for nearly half
of all appeals commenced and terminated (21,423 of 44,546 or 48% of
proceedings commenced and 23,452 of 47,748 or 49% of proceedings
terminated).
79
Compare
JUDICIAL
BUSINESS
2005
tbl.B,
https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/statistics_import_dir/b0.pdf
(68,473 filings during reporting period), with JUDICIAL BUSINESS 2021 tbl.B,
https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/data_tables/jb_b_0930.2021.p
df (44,546 filings during reporting period).
80 Compare JUDICIAL BUSINESS 2005 tbl.B-12, https://www.uscourts.gov/
sites/default/files/statistics_import_dir/s3_1.pdf
(81.6%
national
unpublication rate), with JUDICIAL BUSINESS 2021 tbl.B12 (86.3% national
unpublication rate); see also McAlister, Rebuilding, supra note 3, at 1170-71
(discussing trends and continued reliance on unpublished decisions).
81 See Gluck, et al., supra note 2, at 78-79 (explaining how “highly path
dependent” the federal triage regime is); McAlister, Rebuilding, supra note 3, at
1216 (observing that “[e]ven as judicial workload has eased, the courts have
not begun publishing more cases or hearing more oral argument,” reflecting a
seeming “path dependence to [the courts’] procedural shortcuts”).
78
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and its failures. Moreover, other procedural values—like equality,
dignity, transparency, and legitimacy—are all in some tension with
efficiency.82 Asking courts to do more to further other objectives
may be costly and time-intensive;83 in this way, the triage system
has been constructed to minimize inefficiency (as measured only
by cost and time),84 while maximizing federal appellate docket
control. A readjustment in those priorities may flow from a
recognition that the system’s costs are greater than its efficiency
benefits. This section briefly considers those costs through the
lens of those disadvantaged most by the current system: the
everyday litigants whose appeals receive second-tier treatment.
Most fundamentally, the triage regime defies core notions of
distributive justice, fairness, and equality.85 Matthew Shapiro’s
recent work categorizing the various “goods”86 that access-tojustice arguments seek to distribute recognizes that “judicial
resources” is among those goods.87 A system that distributes
judicial attention sparingly and selectively is one that is
distributionally unequal. Other systemic needs—including, of
course, efficiency interests in the face of a substantial workload—
may justify that disparity, but we must recognize from the outset
that the distribution of judicial attention has been triaged and is,
as a result, distributed unevenly.88

82 Gluck, et al., supra note 2, at 106; see also 8-9 (“[T]he system’s values as
they intersect with nonpublication—for example equality vs. efficiency—are
sometimes in tension with each other.”).
83 Id.
84 As with many of our modern procedural schemes, the appellate triage
system’s exaltation of efficiency may also reflect a certain myopia about the
nature of efficiency itself. As Brooke Coleman has argued, “efficiency” is not
a single-minded talisman to render litigation cheaper and faster; rather, the
drafters of the Federal Rules originally conceived of efficiency “to unburden
civil litigation of needless administrative distraction.” Coleman, supra note 59,
at 1788. Put differently, even those more difficult to quantify costs should
affect our “efficiency” calculus.
85 See Jerry L. Mashaw, Administrative Due Process: The Quest for a Dignitary
Theory, 61 B.U. L. Rev. 885, 889 (1981) (“The demand that the techniques for
making collective decisions not imply that one person’s or group’s contribution
(facts, interpretation, policy argument, etc.) is entitled to greater respect than
another’s merely because of the identity of the person or group is so ubiquitous
and intuitively plausible”).
86 Matthew A. Shapiro, Distributing Civil Justice, 109 GEO. L.J. 1473, 1477
(2021).
87 Id. at 1491-92.
88 See, e.g., RICHMAN & REYNOLDS, INJUSTICE, supra note 15, at 119-120
(recognizing “that cases involving prisoner rights, social security, criminal
convictions, and the like [are] disproportionately subject to second-class
treatment”); Pether, Sorcerers, supra note 3, at 20 (similar); see also see also David
R. Cleveland, Overturning the Last Stone: The Final Step in Returning Precedential
Status to All Opinions, 10 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 61, 147 (2009) (“The
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That unequal distribution creates risks and harms for both the
claimants who receive the least attention and for the system itself.
The triage regime runs on, and perpetuates, inequalities in how
the courts process and resolve disputes.89 It sets up a favored track
for resolving “important” matters (in the eyes of federal judges)
and a lesser track for handling “disfavored” matters—principally,
those brought by “prisoners, the poor, immigrants.”90 That these
procedures favor and are designed by and to the benefit of the
“one percent”—that is, the elite within the system—is not a new
concern, as Brooke Coleman has demonstrated, nor is it one that
affects only the appellate system.91
The effects of triage on disfavored claimants operate on
multiple levels. Systemically, triage regimes threaten public values.
The cases on the losing end of triage are those that Owen Fiss
once described as involving “significant distributional
inequalities,”92 like “the struggle between a member of a racial
minority and a municipal police department over alleged brutality,
or a claim by a worker against a large corporation over workrelated injuries.”93 In that context, adjudication serves “broader”
aims by “explicat[ing] and giv[ing] force to the value embodied in
authoritative texts.”94 Moreover, Fiss argued that in a system
where “imbalances of power can distort judgment,” including
“the quality of presentation,” we depend “on the guiding presence
of the judge . . . to lessen the impact of distributional
inequalities.”95 But the federal appellate judge operating within the
triage regime does quite the opposite: much like the criticisms that
Fiss lodged at settlement, the appellate judge takes advantage of
distributional inequalities to make the process of judgment
easier.96 He or she relies on the unrepresented status of the

discrimination that occurs in a regime of non-precedential opinions is that
similarly situated litigants, indeed even the same litigant in the same factual
setting, may be treated differently by the courts.”).
89 See Gluck, et al., supra note 2, at 78-79 (identifying some of the “path
dependent” aspects of the triage regime, where the initial decision about oral
argument “leads to a presumption of nonpublication, but also a presumption
of staff drafting and cursory review by judges”).
90 RICHMAN & REYNOLDS, INJUSTICE, supra note 18, at 116.
91 Brooke D. Coleman, One Percent Procedure, 91 WASH. L. REV. 1005, 1008
(2016) (defining “one percent procedure” as “a system where the metaphorical
ninety-nine percent of relatively small cases that are the bread and butter of
federal and state dockets are governed by a set of rules made by and for the
elite”).
92 Own M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1087 (1984).
93 Id. at 1076.
94 Id. at 1085.
95 Id. at 1077.
96 These practices, as the Gluck Study warns, “exacerbate concerns about
equality.” Gluck, et al., supra note 2, at 99.
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appellant to shortchange the amount of judicial attention an
appeal receives—often by default rule and irrespective of the
nature of the claim.
Inequalities arising from, and perpetuated by, the triage
regime also threaten to retard legal development in particular
areas of the law. One of the findings of this work, and other recent
work on the federal appellate courts, is that “courts systematically
treat certain types of litigants or certain subject matters
differently.”97 Although the curation that publication and
nonpublication entail have been lauded as valuable efficiency
reforms for the development of the law—that is, they make it
easier to identify what has precedential value98—there’s
something of a Goldilocks problem in this effort. How much
precedential development is enough?99 When have the courts
gotten it just right, as opposed to under-developing or overdeveloping certain areas of the law in certain ways or in certain
regions of the country?100 Ultimately, these effects can, as the
Gluck Study recognized, “skew[] the development of the law in
areas that judges find less interesting or important.”101
Devaluing classes of cases, categorically, as “meritless”
stymies legal innovation writ large, as Alexander Reinert has
argued.102 There’s a big difference, for example, between the
claims of so-called “Sovereign Citizens”103—a quintessential
Id.
One of the concerns animating the creation was systemic nonpublication was that the volume of decisional law was becoming unwieldy.
Reynolds & Richman, Non-Precedential, supra note 60, at 1168-69.
99 And why, for that matter, do the issuing courts themselves have
exclusive control over when they are bound by precedent and when they are
not? See Scott E. Gant, Missing the Forest for a Tree: Unpublished Opinions and the
New Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1, 47 B.C. L. REV. 705 (2006) (arguing
that decision on precedential status of decisions should be “made with the
benefit of time, and with input from lawyers, litigants, and other judges”); see
also Anastasoff v. United States, 223 F.3d 898, 899-900 (8th Cir. 2000), vacated
as moot by 235 F.3d 1054 (2000) (striking down circuit law on non-precedential
decisions as violating Article III’s “judicial power” because judges do not have
the power “to avoid the precedential effect of . . . prior decisions”). But see Hart
v. Massanari, 266 F.3d 1155 (9th Cir. 2001) (disagreeing with Anastasoff).
100 Cf. Gertner, supra note 70, at 113-15 (discussing “asymmetrical”
pressures to write decisions only when granting dispositive relief thus creating
“Losers Rules” and distorting law to advantage defendants).
101 Gluck, et al., supra note 2, at 30-31.
102 Alexander A. Reinert, Screening Out Innovation: The Merits of Meritless
Litigation, 89 Ind. L.J. 1191, 1198-1201 (2014).
103 See Jessica K. Phillips, Note, Not All Pro Se Litigants Are Created Equally:
Examining the Need for New Pro Se Litigant Classifications Through the Lens of the
Sovereign Citizen Movement, 29 GEO. J. L. ETHICS 1221, 1222 (2016) (explaining
that “Sovereign Citizens” are “[a]dherents of [a] loosely organized, borderlinecultish group [that] disclaim[s] the legitimacy of the United States federal
97
98
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“frivolous” filing—and legal arguments that push the envelope or
just fail to overcome the high bar for qualified immunity. The
latter examples, which predominate the second tier, are necessary
for innovation;104 only the former, the Sovereign Citizen, can be
safely screened without imposing any systemic or dignitary harm
on the litigant. Brooke Coleman has made a similar argument in
the context of federal pleading standards.105 The “restrictive”106
turn in procedural doctrine—a turn mirrored in how the appellate
triage regime restricts access to judicial attention—imposes
uneven burdens and advantages. Certain kinds of “vanishing
plaintiffs”—those without access to legal resources and those
whose cultural narratives render them “others”107—suffer
“distinctly” in this new, restrictive regime.108 And the public loses
opportunities for “path-breaking” law as a result.109
Triaging judicial attention also threatens dignitary harms on
litigants themselves.110 As Jerry Mashaw has argued, “decisional
processes” can “preserve and enhance human dignity and selfrespect.”111 The “form” of governmental decisionmaking,
Mashaw has explained, has the capacity to “nurtur[e] or
suppress[]” those “values inherent in or intrinsic to our common

government and, therefore, all laws and financial obligations arising under the
purview of the federal government” and noting that their ultimate goal is “to
use the courtroom as a forum of protest against the very existence of the
judicial system and Federalism itself”).
104 Reinert, supra note 102, at 1226-30 (arguing that meritless cases are
“necessary to the development of a doctrine” and have the ability to “prompt
more direct change in the law,” including through congressional action; they
also have the ability to bring “institutional conduct and behavior” to light, even
where claims may not succeed under current frameworks).
105 Brooke D. Coleman, The Vanishing Plaintiff, 42 SETON HALL L. REV.
501, 503-504 (2012).
106 Id. at 502 (“While in the early 20th Century procedural rules were
animated by a ‘liberal ethos’, today’s procedural regime is undeniably more
restrictive . . . The articulated reason for this move is that frivolous claims
undermine the civil justice system [including by] drain[ing] scarce judicial
resources . . . .”); see also A. Benjamin Spencer, The Restrictive Ethos in Civil
Procedure, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 353 (2010).
107 Coleman, supra note 105, at 503.
108 Id. at 505 (explaining that the “vanishing plaintiff distinctly suffers”
under a restrictive procedural regime).
109 Id. at 504.
110 Dignitary harm, in turn, raises issues of legitimacy. See TOM R. TYLER,
WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 162 (2006) (“Procedural justice is the key
normative judgment influencing the impact of experience on legitimacy”); see
generally McAlister, supra note 11 (arguing that, from a procedural justice
perspective, unpublished decisions can be “marginalizing and (potentially)
legitimacy threatening—a consequence . . . that may follow when courts are
insensitive to procedural justice concerns [like dignity]”).
111 Mashaw, supra note 85, at 886.
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humanity—values such as autonomy, self-respect, or equality.”112
Taking claims by disfavored litigants seriously thus has the
capacity to legitimate unfavorable rulings, making them easier for
litigants to accept.113 But, structurally, the triage system appears to
do the opposite: it tells litigants who receive unpublished
decisions that their decision is “summary” or “nonprecedential,”
which may lead the litigant to question whether she has received
attention and respect from the court114—a concern that may only
grow if the decision is also perfunctory, circular, or unreasoned.115
Ultimately, the courts treat second-tier appeals differently and
they communicate that difference to the litigants in a variety of
ways: by refusing argument, by issuing shorter decisions, and by
issuing “unpublished” decisions. Litigants might conclude that
their appeal has received short shrift, even if they are unaware of
the extent of judicial attention it has (or has not) received. “We
do distinguish,” Mashaw has argued, “between losing and being
treated unfairly.”116 Whether the federal appellate triage system
has crossed that line—that is, whether, through its unequal
processes, it has communicated to disfavored parties that it has
not taken their problems seriously—may be unknowable. But the
risk is great, and persistent, and it is more present in some circuits
than others. What we can observe is the extent of disparate
treatment litigants receive—and those facts may inform how we
weigh the tradeoffs of the current regime.
II. THE BOTTOM RUNG:
UNREPRESENTED APPEALS
This Part describes this Article’s primary contribution: it
discusses the results of a multi-year project examining the
substance of more than 11,000 unpublished decisions issued
across the geographic federal appellate courts during a six-month
period in 2017. What this study shows is that unpublished
decisions themselves are not created equal. Not only are
unpublished decisions used more frequently in cases involving

Id.
TYLER, supra note 110, at 149 (“Authorities can enhance the acceptance
of their decisions by the way they present them to affected parties.”).
114 See Gluck, et al., supra note 2, at 101 (arguing that labeling on
unpublished decisions “may shape parties’ perception of the respect the legal
system offered to them” and that dignitary harms may “increase” if the litigant
is aware of the triage process itself).
115 See McAlister, “Downright Indifference,” supra note 11, at 580-81
(describing how litigants might respond to perfunctory and circular
unpublished decisions that undermine procedural justice values).
116 Mashaw, supra note 85, at 888.
112
113
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unrepresented litigants,117 but it also appears that unrepresented
appellants usually receive decisions half the length of decisions in
comparable, represented appeals. In some circuits, the disparity is
even greater. These data suggest that unrepresented appeals
occupy the bottom rung of appeals in the federal appellate courts.
Those proceeding without a lawyer rarely receive oral argument
or published, law-making decisions.118 They are also more likely
to receive shorter decisions, and decisions in these cases are more
likely to be harder to find on court websites—frustrating interests
of transparency and law development asymmetrically.
Before describing the data supporting these results in Section
C, this Part first describes the data collection process and what is
missing from the compiled dataset. The extended discussion of
what is missing adds to my earlier work on the incompleteness of
commercial resources to find and research unpublished decisions,
and it strengthens the argument for identifying a bottom rung of
federal appellate process for unrepresented litigants.
A. Data Collection
This study evaluates “merits terminations”119 from across the
geographic circuits issued between January 1, 2017, and June 30,
2017. “Merits terminations” are decisions that resolve appellate
proceedings on the merits (as opposed to on procedural

See Gluck, et al., supra note 2, at 37 (“the data reveal that the federal
judiciary is disproportionately and systematically not publishing cases brought
by certain types of litigants—namely litigants representing themselves and
incarcerated individuals”).
118 In this study, less than 4% of cases terminated on the merits after oral
argument involved appellants who were unrepresented throughout the
proceeding. And less than 3% of published decisions were issued in appeals
brought by unrepresented appellants.
119 This is something of a term-of-art, which refers to the “last opinion or
final order,” whether reasoned or not, whether signed or not, issued to resolve
an appeal or other proceeding that originates in the appellate court in the first
instance (that is, something other than appeal from a final judgment or a
decision reviewing final agency action). See, e.g., JUDICIAL BUSINESS 2021 tbl.B12. “Merits” terminations are distinct from procedural ones, where the court
does not reach the merits of the appeal and, instead, dismisses on procedural
grounds (with or without the consent of the parties). Compare JUDICIAL
BUSINESS 2021 tbl.B-5A. When scholars discuss “unpublished decisions” as a
category, they generally mean “unpublished decisions in merits terminations,”
because that is the category of unpublished decisions that the Administrative
Office of the U.S. Courts tracks. So, whenever you see percentages of
unpublished decisions that rely on Administrative Office statistics, those are
merits terminations. The courts reach more decisions or terminations than
those numbers convey, but those are decisions in cases that end for procedural
reasons.
117
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grounds).120 Procedural terminations—which are occasionally
published, usually unpublished, and often just clerk orders121—are
not formally reported by publication status by the Administrative
Office. Scholars don’t tend to focus on that pool of decisions for
a variety of reasons—not the least of which is that they’re hard to
find, typically have no reasoning, and often (but certainly not
always) have little independent value.122
The project began in early 2019, and I selected a six-month
study period from 2017 because it was the most recent period (at
the time) for which data from the Administrative Office of the
U.S. Courts was available for a comparison. Working with various
Bloomberg Law databases,123 I trained a team of research
assistants (RAs) to extract basic case information into Excel and
then hand-code decisions across a variety of fields, including,
among other categories,124 decision word count125 and whether a
rehearing petition126 or a petition for a writ of certiorari had been

For a more thorough discussion of the Administrative Office
terminology and how it reports data, see McAlister, Missing, supra note 10, at
1115-16. Appellate proceedings most commonly involve appeals as of right,
but they also involve original applications and petitions like writs of mandamus
or requests for certificates of appealability. Id.
121 See JUDICIAL BUSINESS 2021 tbl.B-5A; Gluck, et al., supra note 2, at 4344 & n.195 (discussing procedural terminations).
122 See, e.g., Gluck, et al., supra note 2, at 43 n.195 (explaining decision to
exclude most procedural terminations from study).
123 I selected Bloomberg Law, initially, because of its integration of two
databases: an opinions database and a dockets database, which makes it easy to
work backwards from an opinion to that appeal’s docket. To obtain the initial
opinions list, we searched Bloomberg Law’s Court Opinion Database by
circuit, without any restriction except for the date range of 1/1/2017 to
6/30/2017. Unfortunately, obtaining data from the Bloomberg docket system
was quite cumbersome, and it often involved manually updated the relevant
docket to retrieve pertinent information.
124 RAs coded the following for each opinion retrieved: panel members by
judge name; word count; whether a rehearing petition had been filed; and
whether a petition for a writ of certiorari had been filed with the Supreme
Court. They were also asked to review the substance of the decision and answer
“Yes” or “No” as to the following based only on the text of the opinion: (1)
whether the RA could determine the underlying cause of action or criminal
offense; (2) whether the RA could identify the issues decided on appeal; (3)
whether the appellate court offered reasons for the resolution or outcome; and
(4) whether the appellate court expressly and exclusively rested its decision on
the district court’s decision below (and therefore the appellate court did not
offer any independent reasons for its result).
125 Students were instructed to count only the body of the decision,
excluding any header material. Where a concurring or dissenting opinion was
filed, those opinions were excluded from the word count.
126 Because some circuits treat petitions for rehearing en banc in
unpublished decisions as petitions for panel rehearing, 11th Cir. L.R. 35-4, and
to simplify the coding, I did not ask students to distinguish between these
120
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filed. Another RA randomly cross-checked approximately 400 of
these entries, finding a low rate of disagreement (4 of 396) for
these fields.127
I vastly underestimated the difficulty of this undertaking in a
variety of ways. My RAs devoted hundreds of hours to this
project; the work—even at its most basic (like identifying word
count)—was far more burdensome and time-consuming than I
imagined. The laborious nature of hand-coding aside, the most
important difficulty involved data access. The number of
decisions available on Bloomberg Law (and on other commercial
databases) do not match what the Administrative Office reports
the courts issue—sometimes by substantial margins.128 It is nearly
impossible to gather a complete set of published and unpublished
merits terminations from across the circuits for any period using
the easiest and most accessible tools: commercial databases.129
To address this limitation, I decided to use the Federal Judicial
Center (“FJC”) Integrated Database (“IDB”)130 as a baseline
comparison for our hand-coded dataset from Bloomberg Law.131
That database is “the most comprehensive dataset on federal
judicial appeals available,” and, thus, “the dataset typically used by

petitions, treating either as an indication that the losing party on appeal sought
further review.
127 The rate of error or disagreement for other fields was considerably
higher. For more subjective assessments of reason-giving described in note
124, supra, the coders disagreed with each other approximately 12.4% of the
time (or in 49 out of 396 entries). Admittedly, the task was more difficult than
I anticipated. Some examples were clear-cut. Some were less so. As a result, I
have less confidence in these results, compared to objective indicia—in
particular, word count—that may be a proxy (however imperfect) for these
same kinds of concerns about reason-giving quality. Because of the
disagreement rate, I’ve prioritized the discussion of word count throughout.
128 For a thorough discussion of this problem, see generally McAlister,
Missing, supra note 12.
129 See also Gluck, et al., supra note 2, at 10, 45-46 (discussing issues related
to accessing data and confirming findings in Missing Decisions).
130 Integrated Database, FED. JUD. CTR., https://www.fjc.gov/research/idb.
The IDB, which the Administrative Office makes available for public use,
contains detailed case information for all federal appeals (from the geographic
circuit courts) filed, terminated, and pending from fiscal year 2008 to the
present. The FJC codes many categories that describe aspects of the appeal.
Researchers can use the database to identify and isolate unpublished decisions,
decisions reached without oral argument, appeals brought by unrepresented
parties, and appeals involving similar claims, and similar outcomes (among
other variables). For a complete overview of coded material, see FJC Appeals
Codebook.
131 By combining the FJC data with the hand-coded data from Bloomberg
Law, I was able to supplement the FJC data with information contained only
in the docket and decision itself, including information about word count, the
identity of the panel, and post-decision history.
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scholars studying the judiciary.”132 This dataset is generally
reliable,133 but the FJC acknowledges (yet fails to explain) data
quality concerns for “specific fields related to under-served
populations,” including “regarding pro se litigants, in forma
pauperis (IFP) status, and class action allegations.”134 FJC data
entry is not centralized, which can lead to some discrepancies in
how courts record certain variables.135 Nevertheless, it is a
powerful, and generally accurate,136 tool.
For each line of hand-coded data describing an entry in the
Bloomberg Law database, I matched137 those data to an entry
from the FJC database.138 This was a laborious process,139 but one
that allowed me to overcome the central limitations of the IDB:
it doesn’t contain the text of the relevant opinion or order. At the
same time, the matching process also enabled me to isolate what

Gluck, et al., supra note 2, at 114.
Id.
134 The Integrated Database: A Research Guide, FED. JUD. CTR.,
https:www.fjc.gov/research/idb.
135 The Administrative Office uses some IDB data to generate its annual
Judicial Business publication (which includes reports on unpublished decisions,
among others), and which, as a result, are subject to quality checks. See Gluck,
et al., supra note 2, at 114-15 (discussing data quality issues with IDB and its
limitations).
136 See Adam M. Samaha, Michael Heise & Gregory C. Sisk, Inputs and
Outputs on Appeal: An Empirical Study of Briefs, Big Law, and Case Complexity, 17 J.
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 519, 529-30 (2020) (discussing confidence in
Administrative Office data).
137 The matching process involved comparing case numbers.
Unfortunately, the two systems do not use the same unique number to identify
cases, but it is relatively easy to derive the FJC IDB number—a seven-digit
number—from the docket number reported by the court on the face of the
opinion in the Bloomberg Law database. Where courts use six-digit case
numbers, e.g., 15-3216, the IDB reports those as “1503216,” replacing the
hyphen with a “0.” See FJC Appeals Codebook, Integrated Data Base Appeals
Documentation FY 2008 – Present, FED. JUD. CTR., at 1,
https://www.fjc.gov/sites/default/files/idb/codebooks/Appeals%20Codeb
ook%202008%20Forward%20rev%2002102021.pdf [hereinafter FJC Appeals
Codebook]. Where a court—specifically, the Fifth, Ninth, or Eleventh
Circuit—uses a seven-digit case number, e.g., “15-13216,” the IDB reports the
number as “1513216.” Id.
138 To obtain the FJC baseline, I ran searches by circuit and judgment date
(between January 1, 2017 and June 30, 2017) in the IDB Appeals database.
139 To accomplish the task, I married the two datasets by case number.
The marrying process involved some automation, whereby I used Excel’s
“MATCH” function to identify line matches between the Bloomberg Law
dataset and the FJC IDB dataset. That allowed easy identification of
mismatches (both duplicate matches and non-matches), and to investigate
whether any data-entry error (e.g., a transcription error in the manual
conversion of the case number into a seven-digit number to pair with the IDB)
created the mismatch. The rate of mismatches remaining after error check
appear below in Table 1.
132
133
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was missing from Bloomberg Law during the same period and
identify certain key features of what was missing. Although the
volume of what was missing was too great to retrieve by hand (a
task that becomes necessary if the opinion is not on a commercial
database), the IDB enables us to identify a significant amount of
descriptive information about those missing decisions in each
circuit. In the end, this time-consuming process gave an accurate
snapshot of what the courts were doing during that six-month
period and what researchers can find of that work on at least one
commercial database.
Table 1 identifies the data retried from and matched between
both the IDB and Bloomberg Law’s Court Opinions database.
Overall, the match rates—meaning the ability to associate a
Bloomberg Law Court Opinions database hit with termination
case information from the IDB—were quite high. But, as the raw
numbers in Table 1 also reveal, Bloomberg Law has far fewer
entries than the IDB has for the same period: those are mostly the
missing decisions discussed below (as well as procedural
terminations). For now, what’s important is that this process
matched nearly all Bloomberg Law Court Opinions database
entries with an associated IDB entry: the match rate was at or
more than 92% (and usually higher) across all but two circuits.

Fed. Cir.
Ct.
D.C.
First
Second
Third
Fourth
Fifth
Sixth
Seventh
Eighth
Ninth
Tenth
Eleventh

Table 1: FJC IDB to Bloomberg
Law Database Entries
FJC
BL Op.
%
Matched
IDB
DB
Matched
547
449
328
73%
762
263
242
92%
2093
873
838
96%
2162
779
765
98%
2412
1727
1688
98%
4014
1742
1706
98%
2675
1000
927
93%
1519
621
605
97%
1656
918
733
80%
6324
2680
2563
96%
1013
589
573
97%
3307
1166
1136
97%

Let me say a few words about the outliers: the D.C. Circuit
and the Eighth Circuit, both of which had match percentages
significantly lower than their peers. The Bloomberg Law Court
Opinions database entries for these circuits had a large volume of
miscellaneous, non-dispositive orders, including (predominantly)
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orders denying panel rehearing or rehearing en banc.140 Where
multiple Bloomberg Law Court Opinions database hits had the
same case number, and thus where I had multiple matches for the
same line of IDB data, 141 I only retained the Bloomberg Law entry
associated with the termination decision.142 My combined dataset
contains 12,104 total matched entries; approximately 8.6% of
those entries involved procedural terminations, which I have
excluded.143
The remaining dataset of merits terminations has decisional
features comparable to the reported statistics for 2017, but the
problem of missing decisions results, generally, in a dataset that is
slightly under-inclusive in terms of unpublished decisions and
cases decided without oral argument in most circuits. Appendix B
compares my dataset with 5-year means (between 2015 and 2020)
and the 2017 reporting year for rates of unpublished decisions and
cases decided without oral argument. If anything, the dataset
presents a slightly rosier picture of the decisional practices in
some circuits (especially those with more significant numbers of
missing decisions, as discussed below). Taken as a whole, the
dataset generally comports with (that is, is within one standard
deviation of) the national averages during the same period.
There’s no reason to think that the data discussed here are
exceptional or unusual, as opposed to representative of overall

140 See, e.g., United States v. Trabelsi, No. 15-3075, 2017 BL 108217 (D.C.
Cir. Mar. 31, 2017) (denying rehearing en banc); Rothe Dev., Inc. v. Dep’t of
Def., No. 15-5176, 2017 BL 11544 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 13, 2017) (same); Thompson
v. Shock, No. No: 16-1643, 2017 BL 188750 (8th Cir. June 05, 2017) (same);
United States v. Reccarro, No. 16-1414, 2017 BL 17667 (8th Cir. Jan. 20, 2017)
(same).
141 A database search retrieves these orders as individual data entries in a
date-limited search (and they each have unique database or citation numbers),
but they would not pair with a single FJC IDB entry (or sometimes even one
from the relevant period), because the IDB date-search retrieved termination
information (as opposed to information about any order issued during the
period). The IDB also generally contains only one line of data for each final
decision.
142 To increase matching speed, I did this visually most of the time, by
comparing word counts (e.g., I assumed a 1,000-word decision was the merits
decision and a 50-word decision was a miscellaneous order) or by retaining the
last filed decision based on date (unless the hand-coded data indicated the last
decision related to the denial of rehearing because of relative word count).
Where it was unclear, I looked up multiple entries to determine the best fit by
date of decision according to the IDB.
143 Of the procedural terminations, 544 of 1,038 or more than 52%, were
judge-issued terminations. During that same period, only 26.5% of procedural
terminations were judge-issued. It’s unsurprising that judge-issued procedural
terminations are more likely to appear in commercial databases, given the
greater likelihood that they are reasoned decisions (compared to clerk-issued
dismissals).
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trends in the circuits during the same period. Where discrepancies
exist, that’s generally the result of missing decisions, which are,
merits terminations not available on Bloomberg Law but reported
as having been issued by the courts—a topic I turn to next.
B. Missing Decisions
Contrary to a longstanding assumption,144 scholars now agree
that commercial databases (and free court websites) do not
contain all unpublished merits terminations from the federal
appellate courts.145 Commercial databases generally populate their
databases with the decisions freely available on court websites, but
courts are required to post only content they deem to satisfy a
federal “written opinions” standard on free court websites.146
Courts, judges, and court clerks all seemingly take different views
on what meets the “written opinions” standard, thus generating
disparate access regimes across the courts of appeals.147 Decisions
not made available for free remain locked behind a docketing
system paywall; they remain publicly available, but for a price148
(and one that commercial databases appear to pay only when a
customer requests inclusion of these decisions in the database).149
It is important, then, to start with what was missing from the
commercial database—Bloomberg Law—I used to construct this
dataset. Consistent with recent work on this topic, my study

See, e.g., RICHMAN & REYNOLDS, INJUSTICE, supra note 15, at 59
(“Unpublished decisions are now available online and can be easily accessed
and analyzed there.”).
145 See generally McAlister, Missing, supra note 12 (discussing existence of
“missing decisions,” which are unpublished decisions that courts say they issue
but are not available on free court websites and commercial databases); see also
Gluck, et al., supra note 2, at 10 (confirming finding in Missing Decisions and
observing that “court websites and commercial databases contained only
limited subsets of all unpublished opinions”).
146 See McAlister, Missing, supra note 12, at 1114-16 (explaining how
databases obtain federal appellate content); id. at 1160-62 (explaining that only
decisions designated as “written opinions” must be available for free under
federal law). For a thorough treatment of the E-Government Act’s “written
opinions” requirement, see Peter W. Martin, District Court Opinions that Remain
Hidden Despite a Long-Standing Congressional Mandate of Transparency—The Result of
Judicial Autonomy and Systemic Indifference, 110 L. LIB. J. 305 (2018).
147 See McAlister, Missing, supra note 12, at 1161 (discussing implementation
problems with the “written opinions” requirement for accessing federal judicial
decisions).
148 For example, in earlier work, I amassed more than $80 in fees to obtain
approximately 250 missing decisions from one circuit during a one-year period.
See id. at 1139 n.161.
149 Id. at 1158-59 (discussing dynamics between databases and their
customers and circumstances for adding material to databases).
144
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confirmed (at least the historical)150 incompleteness of the
Bloomberg Law Court Opinions database, which has coverage
comparable to LexisNexis’s commercial database.151 What’s
missing, predominantly, are decisions in prisoner appeals among
those missing decisions from appeals of final judgments, as well
as decisions in original proceedings, which also largely involve
prisoner litigation (for example, a request to file a second or
successive habeas petition152). Bear with me: this gets a bit
complicated to explain, as I walk through in some detail what’s
missing (and how I identified those cases).
Let’s start with the raw numbers of what the FJC IDB
database contains for the six-month period at issue.153 Table 3
details the number of merits terminations154 reported in the
database for the study period (January 1, 2017 to June 30, 2017).
It also breaks down (and then excludes) consolidated cases from
these totals; we would not expect more than one commercial
database hit for consolidated cases, even though each case (even
if consolidated with another) will have a unique line of IDB
data.155 Table 2 then compares those post-consolidation merits
terminations with the merits terminations matched from the
Bloomberg Law (“BL”) database; the difference is what is
“presumed” missing—and by that, I mean, the apparent shortfall
between what Bloomberg Law reports and what the IDB
contains. Figure 1 graphically identifies the percentage of merits
terminations presumed missing across the circuits. Those data

150 By historical, here, I mean the incompleteness of the database for the
period at issue; this work does not offer any insight into whether the databases
have greater coverage for decisions issued today.
151 See McAlister, Missing, supra note 12, at 1129 n.135 (noting similarity
between LexisNexis and Bloomberg Law coverage).
152 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b) (requiring applicant to request permission by
motion in the court of appeals to file a second or successive habeas petition).
153 Because the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts only reports data
on a 12-month rolling basis in three-month intervals, it was necessary for me
to derive these numbers from the FJC IDB raw data. All data are on file with
[LAW REVIEW].
154 To identify “merits terminations,” I used a COUNTIFS function to
identify the number of IDB entries from each circuit coded with a “merits”
termination in the IDB’s disposition field. See FJC Appeals Codebook, at 9
(describing “DISP” field).
155 This approach is consistent with the evaluation of missing decisions in
other work, which also relied on post-consolidation merits terminations; the
major difference is that earlier work used numbers reported by the
Administrative Office in its annual Judicial Business publication and compared
those numbers to database hits. See McAlister, Missing, supra note 12, at 112025 (describing data collection process). That study predicted Bloomberg Law’s
missing decisions to be around 27% for this period. See id. at 1128, fig.2. These
data demonstrate it is significantly higher.

30

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4211611

91 FORDHAM L. REV. ___ (forthcoming 2023)
demonstrate that the problem of missing decisions, and concerns
over the completeness of a dataset, are uneven across the circuits.
Table 2: Comparing IDB Merits Terminations to
Bloomberg Law Database Entries for Merits Terminations
Between January 1, 2017 and June 30, 2017
Fed. Cir.
Ct.

Merits
Terms.
in IDB

D.C.
First
Second
Third
Fourth
Fifth
Sixth
Seventh
Eighth
Ninth
Tenth
Eleventh

349
498
1368
1648
1865
2715
1954
916
1363
4208
657
1925

TOTAL

19466

Consol.
Cases
Term.
on
Merits156
95
39
97
22
87
453
62
55
64
211
10
89
1284

PostConsol.
Merits
Terms.

Merits
Terms.
in
BL157

Presumed
Missing

254
459
1271
1626
1778
2262
1892
861
1299
3997
647
1836

253
207
786
679
1520
1613
821
528
686
2420
513
1039

1
252
485
947
258
649
1071
333
613
1577
134
797

18182

11065

7117

% of Merits
Terms.
Presumed
Missing
0.4%
54.9%
38.2%
58.2%
14.5%
28.7%
56.6%
38.7%
47.2%
39.5%
20.7%
43.4%
39.1%

156 To identify consolidated appeals, I used a COUNTIFS function to
identify all “merits” terminations (based on disposition), see supra note 156, with
a joined appeal, which would be either a cross appeal or a consolidated appeal
(a “1” or “2” under the “JOINAPP” field). FJC Appeals Codebook, at 12-13.
157 These are “matched” Bloomberg Law entries—meaning entries that
matched with a merits termination from the same period as reported in the
IDB.
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Figure 1: Percentage of Merits Terminations Presumed
Missing Across the Circuits in Dataset
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In an earlier study of this problem I observed that my
estimates of coverage were likely “overly optimistic,”158 and,
unfortunately, I was right. Those estimates pegged coverage for
merits terminations during this period on Bloomberg Law as near
73% total (with roughly 27% of merits terminations missing).159
The results here find closer to 40% of merits decisions presumed
missing from the database based on comparing matched
Bloomberg Law database entries for merits terminations to the
total number of IDB entries for non-consolidated or lead case
merits terminations during the same period.160 Consistent with
that earlier work, coverage in the D.C. Circuit is outstanding, and
the single presumed missing decision is a result of a reporting
glitch explained below—one that likely accounts for some
portion, but certainly far from all, of these missing entries.
Because of how I constructed the dataset, I’m able to do more
than identify presumptively missing decisions: I can identify
decisions that are, in fact, missing from Bloomberg Law’s Court
Opinions database. By taking a closer look at trends in the
decisions that are missing, we can learn more about what kinds of
decisions are under-reported on commercial databases. Table 4
describes the collection of “missing” or unmatched entries from

158 I described estimates of missing decisions as “overly optimistic”
because I was not able to exclude procedural terminations, duplicate entries,
and miscellaneous orders from commercial database comparisons. See
McAlister, Missing, supra note 12, at 1127-28 (explaining likelihood that some
non-trivial percentage of database “hits” are not merits terminations, therefore
making estimates of coverage “optimistic”).
159 Id. at 1128 & fig.2.
160 These are appeals coded as either “0” (for no consolidation) or “3”
(designated as the lead case) in the “JOINAPP” field. FJC Appeals Codebook,
at 12-13.
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the IDB database—that is, those entries for which I could not
identify a Bloomberg Law database match in the hand-coded
dataset. It’s possible, of course, that some of these unmatched
entries resulted from a data-entry error (mine or the court’s), but
that’s unlikely to account for all missing decisions (especially given
the high-overall matching rate). But there do appear to be some
significant court errors—or discrepancies—that may account for
a substantial portion of missing decisions in at least some circuits,
as I will explain below. For now, Table 3 identifies the number of
entries among IDB entries for merits terminations that are
missing from Bloomberg Law. These decisions are subdivided by
those that have been resolved with or without oral argument, and
the numbers reported here reflect only those decisions that were
identified either as not consolidated or as a lead case in an
otherwise consolidated appeal. For both categories of cases, we
would expect a corresponding decision in Bloomberg Law. The
final column notes the margin of error based on the numbers of
presumed missing decisions from Table 2.
Table 3: IDB Entries Missing from Bloomberg Law
Database (Unconsolidated Merits Terminations with and
without Oral Argument)161
Uncons.
Uncons.
All
Merits
Merits
Percentage
Fed. Cir.
Uncons.
Terms.
Terms.
Prediction
Ct.
Merits
After
w/o
Error
Terms.
Argument Argument
D.C.
1
1
2
50%
First
17
230
247
-2.0%
Second
22
454
476
-1.9%
Third
523
426
949
0.2%
Fourth
1
254
255
-1.2%
Fifth
2
593
595
-9.1%
Sixth
4
1061
1065
-0.6%
Seventh
1
328
329
-1.2%
Eighth
2
606
608
-0.8%
Ninth
43
1528
1571
-0.4%
Tenth
35
98
133
-0.8%
Eleventh
4
791
795
-0.3%

161 These numbers reflect missing entries satisfying the following criteria:
using the “DISP,” field, the termination was one on the merits issued after oral
argument (“1”) or without oral argument (“2”), which are the totals in the first
and second columns. FJC Appeals Codebook, at 9. All entries were counted
only if the “JOINAPP” field, which tracks consolidation, was either a “0” (no
consolidation) or a “3” (lead case). Id. at 12-13.
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TOTAL

655

6370

7025

-1.3%

Overall, this approach—comparing database hits against
expected entries based on court-side data—appears predictively
sound for estimating missing decisions for most circuits. But
something in Table 4 likely jumps out at you (and may strike you
as suspicious): the number of missing decisions from the Third
Circuit involving unconsolidated merits terminations issued after
oral argument. Indeed, nearly 80% of all missing decisions
following oral argument in this dataset are from the Third Circuit.
It turns out that’s a reporting glitch from the Third Circuit. That
year, the court treated at least 510 appeals in the Fosamax multidistrict litigation162 (all of which were filed against the same
defendant Merck & Co., which makes them easy to spot in the
raw data) as un-joined appeals.163 These appeals were all resolved
after one oral argument, involved joint briefing, and one, final
published opinion.164 In my view, they should have been treated
as consolidated appeals for reporting purposes, especially because
treating the cases as un-joined skews the Third Circuit’s statistics
on oral argument and publication (both of which count un-joined
or post-consolidation cases).165
If we remove the Fosamax MDL from the data, the number
of missing decisions drops to 6,515 overall and only 145 missing
merits terminations decided after oral argument. It’s entirely

In re Fosamax (Alendronate Sodium) Prods. Liab. Litig., 852 F.3d 268,
271 at * (2017) (noting that the “opinion applies to all appeals listed in
Appendix A”).
163 See Matthew Stiegler, I’ve updated yesterday’s post about Third Circuit
case statistics: data I originally thought was significant turns out to be
meaningless,
CA3blog,
March
16,
2018,
http://ca3blog.com/suggestionbox/ive-updated-yesterdays-post-about-thirdcircuit-case-statistics-data-i-originally-thought-was-significant-turns-out-tobe-meaningless/ (recognizing that increase appeared “jaw-dropping” but that
the “source of the problem” was treating the Fosamax appeal as over 500
separate cases).
164 Id.
165 I think it’s fair to characterize this as an error. At some point between
when I wrote an article (in 2019) that relied on publication statistics from the
Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, see McAlister, “Downright Indifference,”
supra note 14, at 597 fig. A-4, and now, the Administrative Office adjusted the
publication statistics for the Third Circuit to treat these cases as consolidated
for those purposes. Table B-12 for 2017 now indicates that “[t]otals for cases
terminated on the merits in the Third Circuit and in the nation have been
revised following resolution of a technical issue affecting the data.” JUDICIAL
BUSINESS 2017, tbl. B-12. This “technical issue” was so significant as to affect
the national non-publication rate that year (from 86.9%, as I had used in
“Downright Indifference,” McAlister, supra note 14, at 550, fig. 1, to 88.2%, as it is
now corrected, JUDICIAL BUSINESS 2017, tbl. B-12).
162
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possible that some of those numbers are misleading for the same
reason—that is, that there are other cases where the court resolves
more than one appeal with a single decision yet treats the appeal
as un-joined. But it’s unlikely that happens so frequently as to
account for more than 6,000 missing decisions. Indeed, within the
entire 2017 reporting year, only 3,022 appeals were reported as
consolidated; it seems improbable that within a six-month period
there were more than twice as many pocket consolidations that
would skew the statistics so substantially. That said, it’s quite likely
that all or nearly all 145 missing decisions from terminations after
oral argument result from the same Fosamax MDL-type
problem,166 and for this reason I will assume these decisions are
not really “missing” for the same reason.167
Among the 6,369 remaining merits terminations that did not
match with any Bloomberg Law Court Opinions entry, it’s likely
that more than 75% of those decisions are substantive—at least
in the sense that the courts self-reported that these decisions were
“reasoned.” Figure 2 identifies the relative percentages of courtreported reason-giving among what’s missing. Of course, courts
self-report these figures, and there’s reason to believe they may be
more generous than a reader might be in how they describe the
extent of their reasoning.168 But what we do know is that many of
these decisions at least say something, as opposed to simply
“affirmed.” It’s important to keep in mind, though, that even

See, e.g., Serrano-Alberto v. Attorney General, 859 F.3d 208 (3d Cir.
2017) (listing Case No. 16-1586 in caption but case appears in missing decision
data and court does not denote it as a joined appeal); United States v. Barret,
848 F.3d 524, 524 (2d Cir. 2017) (identifying Case No. 13-3800 in caption but
case appears in missing decision data and court does not denote it as a joined
appeal).
167 Going forward, I also exclude the D.C. Circuit from the discussion of
missing decisions. One of its two missing decisions is a consolidated decision.
Ampersand Publ’g, LLC v. NLRB, No. 15-1074, 2017 BL 67821 (D.C. Cir.
March 3, 2017) (identifying Case No. 13-3800 in caption but case appears in
missing decision data and court does not denote it as a joined appeal). The
other—the only real missing decision—is an order granting a petition for leave
to file a successive motion for relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. In re Nugent, No.
16-3118 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 10, 2017).
168 For example, the Fourth Circuit reported issuing no unreasoned
decisions during the relevant reporting period. JUDICIAL BUSINESS 2017 tbl.B12. Yet it would be difficult to describe all decisions in Appendix A, which are
all from the Fourth Circuit, as “reasoned” within the meaning of that report,
which defines reasoned decisions ones “only opinions and orders which
expound the law as applied to the facts of the case and detail the judicial reasons
upon which the judgment is based.” JUDICIAL BUSINESS 2017 tbl.B-12; see also
McAlister, “Downright Indifference,” supra note 14, at 576-77 & n.220 (discussing
extent of reason-giving in perfunctory decisions with examples from Fourth
and Eighth Circuits, where one decision was labeled as “reasoned” and one
was not).
166
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where there’s no reasoning, an unreasoned or summary
affirmance may still have value as an indication of appellate
approval of a district court decision. Missing unreasoned
decisions in direct appeals thus risk misrepresenting the
procedural history of an appealed district court decision that
appears in a commercial database.169
Figure 2: Proportion of Reason-Giving in Unpublished
Decisions Among Missing IDB Entries
Unpublished,
Unsigned, w/o
Comment,
22.9%

Published
Decisions, 0.1%

Unpublished,
Reasoned,
Signed, 16.2%

Unpublished,
Reasoned,
Unsigned,
60.6%

Figure 3, below, represents what’s missing across the circuits
based on the expected extent of reason-giving. Observe that in
the only two circuits (the Eighth and Ninth Circuits) that report
meaningful numbers of unreasoned decisions, many were missing
(more than 1,300 in total). Large numbers of reasoned decisioned
were missing from the Second, Fifth, Sixth, Ninth, and Eleventh
Circuits—all of which are busy circuits. Keep the existence of
missing decisions from these circuits in mind when considering
the average word count statistics below. In each of these circuits,
the observed disparities between represented and unrepresented
appellants may be artificially diminished because of the effect of
missing decisions. Table 4 provides a more detailed breakdown of
the data represented graphically in Figure 3.

169 See McAlister, Missing, supra note 12, at 1147-48 (observing that missing
decisions “skew the procedural history information of the district court
decisions otherwise included in those databases” and relaying that commercial
databases describe one-word affirmances as “highly valuable as part of the
overall case history”).
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Figure 3: Entries Missing by Reason-Giving
Across the Circuits
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Table 4: Reason-Giving in Missing IDB Entries170
Unpub.,
Unpub.,
Unpub.,
Fed. Cir.
Unsigned,
Reasoned, Reasoned,
Ct.
and w/o
Signed
Unsigned
Comment
First
0
215
14
Second
452
1
0
Third
383
7
35
Fourth
161
93
0
Fifth
0
592
0
Sixth
6
1050
2
Seventh
0
321
3
Eighth
0
3
603
Ninth
0
750
771
Tenth
27
69
0
Eleventh
1
756
34
TOTAL

1030

3857

1462

170 This totals to 6,349, which is slightly less than the 6,369 number of
non-argued missing entries noted above. Eight decisions were published, and
I have omitted those for the same reason I exclude the argued missing entries.
The remaining shortfall reflects a small handful of entries that were missing the
relevant coding criteria.
The numbers here reflect those missing decisions from each circuit that
satisfied the following conditions: the “DISP” code was “2,” meaning the
decision was on the merits and reached without oral argument; the
“JOINAPP” code was either a “0” or “3,” to exclude consolidated or non-lead
appeals; and the “PUBSTAT” code was either “3,” “5,” or “7,” respectively to
identify the type of unpublished decision (signed is 3; unsigned but reasoned is
5, and unreasoned is 7). See FJC Appeals Codebook, 9, 12-13.
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Many of these missing decisions—likely around 50%—
involve a decision in an appeal from a final judgment in the district
court. Figure 4 identifies the relative percentage of missing
termination decisions by appeal type (with some categories
combined for clarity). Table 5 provides more detailed information
about what appears graphically in Figure 4; it identifies the
number of missing entries by type of appeal across each circuit.171
What’s perhaps most significant about these data is that they
demonstrate that two expected categories of missing decisions—
original proceedings172 and immigration matters173—only account
for a little less than half of the missing entries in this dataset.
Figure 4: Relative Percentage of
Missing Entries by Appeal Type
Other
1%

Admin.
Review ,
6.5%

Criminal &
U.S. PostConvict.,
10.7%

Civil, U.S.,
14.6%

Orig.
Proceed.,
41.1%

Civil,
Private,
26.3%

Overall, across most circuits many missing decisions arise from
ordinary civil proceedings in appeals as of right (or on requests
for certificates of appealability). Figure 5 graphically reflects the
This Table reports “APPTYPE” for the IDB entries not recovered
from the same date-limited search in the Bloomberg Law Opinions database.
See FJC Appeals Codebook, at 2-3. The category “Criminal” here includes
appeals coded with 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19 or 20. Id. at 3. “Federal postconviction” identifies only those appeals coded as “21,” which are “appeal[s]
arising from a USDC order entered after the judgment of conviction,” and thus
does not include 28 U.S.C. § 2254 proceedings. Id. at 3.
172 See McAlister, Missing, supra note 12, at 1134-35 (hypothesizing that
original proceedings may account for some, but not all, of what’s missing from
commercial databases).
173 See Michael Kagan, Rebecca Gill & Fatma Marouf, Invisible Adjudication
in the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 106 GEO. L.J. 683, 685-86 (2018) (establishing that
many unpublished decisions in immigration matters are unavailable on
Westlaw and, to a lesser extent, LexisNexis).
171
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number of missing decisions across the major appeal types in each
circuit, while Table 6 provides exact numbers on what Figure 5
represents graphically.
Figure 5: Missing Decision by Appeal Type
Across the Circuits
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Table 5: Missing IDB Entries in
Unpublished Decisions by Appeal Type174
Fed. Cir.
Ct.

Admin.
Review175

Admin.
Enforce.

Civil,
U.S.

Civil,
Private

Orig.
Proc.

Bankr.

First
Second
Third
Fourth
Fifth
Sixth
Seventh
Eighth
Ninth

3
38
16
13
8
49
5
4
248

1
3
3
3
0
6
0
0
4

25
39
48
4
86
155
96
105
132

32
149
98
4
182
293
90
92
461

65
116
220
179
275
322
103
351
554

2
5
0
1
1
6
0
0
8

Criminal
(and Fed.
PostConviction)
94
83
30
43
24
206
14
44
59

174 These are appeals that satisfy all conditions in Table 5 counted by
“APPTYPE” field. See FJC Appeals Codebook, at 2-3.
175 Ninety-seven percent (or 391 of 403) administrative review proceedings
involve immigration-related appeals. To obtain this number, I identified the
number of appeals involving Administrative Review that also involved the
Immigration and Naturalization Service as the designated Agency in the IDB
(code “6” in “AGENCY” field). FJC Appeals Codebook, at 6.
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Tenth
Eleventh

3
16

0
0

11
201

12
209

63
291

1
1

3
24

TOTAL

403

20

902

1622

2359

25

624

Drilling down a bit deeper into these categories, it quickly
becomes apparent that most missing entries involve litigation with
vulnerable populations: criminal defendants, prisoners,
undocumented persons, or persons without permanent status in
the United States. Of the missing original proceedings, 2,202 of
2,539 or 86.7% involve petitions requesting permission to file a
second or successive habeas corpus petition. Among the two
categories of civil litigation (which, together, are the largest
category), 2,158 of 2,524 or 85.5% of all missing terminations in
civil proceedings involve prisoner litigation. Table 6 identifies the
prisoner nature of suit codes for the missing decisions for “Civil,
U.S.” and “Civil, Private”176 appeal types. Of the prisoner appeals
that are missing slightly more than 60% involve state
defendants.177 Collectively, that means that 5,021 of 6,349 or
79.0% of missing terminations with unpublished adjudications
involve appeals or original proceedings brought by either a
prisoner or a criminal defendant. If we add immigration matters
(391) to those totals, then 85.2% of missing entries involve
litigation with vulnerable populations.
Table 6: Civil Appeal Types by Prisoner Nature of Suit
Codes in Missing Entries Dataset178
Fed. Cir.
Ct.
First
Second
Third
Fourth

Prisoner
Prisoner
Petitions
Petitions
(Vacate
(Habeas)
Sentence)
17
11
18
46
31
93
1
2

Death
Penalty
Habeas
0
0
0
0

Prisoner
Prisoner
Petitions—
Civil
Mandamus
Rights
& Other
0
6
2
35
1
4
0
0

Prisoner—
Prison
Total
Conditions
0
8
2
1

This name is a bit mis-leading, as it should not imply civil, nongovernmental; it means civil matters not involving the United States as a party.
Many prisoner lawsuits (including petitions under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 and civil
rights claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983) fall within this large, umbrella category.
177 To derive this figure, I used the “JURIS” field for Prisoner Petitions
(identified by the “NOS” field, see infra note 180), which has a special
value/interpretation in the IDB for prisoner appeals. See FJC Appeals
Codebook, at 6.
178 This table uses the “NOS” field in the IDB. See FJC Appeals Codebook,
at 6-7 & 21-23. Prisoner appeals are identified as follows: “510 Prisoner
Petitions-Vacate Sentence”; “530 Prisoner Petitions-Habeas Corpus”; “535
Habeas Corpus: Death Penalty”; “540 Prisoner Petitions -Mandamus and
Other”; “550 Prisoner -Civil Rights”; “555 Prisoner – Prison Condition.” Id. at
22.
176
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Fifth
Sixth
Seventh
Eighth
Ninth
Tenth
Eleventh

83
124
69
91
83
6
188

178
219
92
51
312
2
168

0
2
0
2
1
0
4

0
1
3
2
3
1
1

1
18
0
15
73
4
24

1
15
4
17
11
0
11
TOTAL

Given the large volume of prisoner litigation among the
missing entries, it’s no surprise that the vast majority of what’s
missing involves appeals where the appellant was unrepresented
throughout the proceeding: 4,578 of 6,370 missing decisions or
more than 71% of all missing decisions involve proceedings with
a unrepresented appellant. In every circuit, the share of missing
entries involving unrepresented appellants exceeds the five-year
means for unrepresented (or pro se) appeals in the circuit. Table
7 details these findings across the circuits.
Table 7: Representation Status of Appellants in Missing
Entries (and Compared to Overall Rate in Circuit)179
Appellant Pro
5-YR Mean
% of Overall
Fed.
Se at Filing
for % of Pro
Missing
Cir. Ct.
and
Se Appellants
Entries
Termination
(SD)
First
120
52.2%
34.6% (2.1%)
Second
309
68.1%
39.5% (4.2%
Third
239
56.1%
52.9% (4.3%)
Fourth
176
69.3%
60.7% (1.3%)
Fifth
519
87.5%
45.3% (1.3%)
Sixth
735
69.3%
57.4% (0.7%)
Seventh
265
80.8%
59.1% (1.1%)
Eighth
491
81.0%
52.4% (1.6%)
Ninth
1031
67.5%
45.4% (1.8%)
Tenth
66
67.3%
47.3% (2.4%)
Eleventh
627
79.3%
58.2% (2.1%)
TOTAL

4578

71.8%

49.1% (9.1%)

As we might expect, nearly 75% of what’s missing from merits
decisions on appeal (as opposed to in original proceedings)
involves affirmances or denials of certificates of appealability,

179 To generate this table, I counted those merits terminations issued
without oral argument (“DISP” code “2”) that were either not consolidated or
were lead cases (“JOINAPP” code “0” or “3”) and where the appellant was
pro se at filing and termination (“PROSEFLE” and “PROSETRM” both equal
“1”). See FJC Appeals Codebook, at 2, 12-13, & 17-18.
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which function as affirmances in habeas corpus proceedings.180
But what may be surprising is that nearly 7% of the missing entries
involve an arguably favorable result for the appellant: a reversal
(2.8%); a reversal in part (0.5%) or a remand (3.4%). The
nationwide reversal rate for the same period—a rate that does not
count reversals in part or remands—was only 7.8%.181 Figure 6
identifies these outcomes graphically, while Table 8 describes the
outcomes in the missing terminations from across the circuits.
Figure 6: Outcomes by Percentages Among Missing
Entries Across All Circuits
Affirmed,
26.7%

Denied
Certificate of
Appealability,
47.6%

Reversed ,
2.8%
Affimed in
Part/Reversed
in Part, 0.5%

Other,
0.2%

Remanded,
3.4%

Dismissed,
18.6%

Table 8: Outcomes in Missing Entries (Excl. Original
Proceedings)182
Fed. Cir.
Ct.

Affirmed/
Enforced

Reversed

Aff’d in part/
Rev’d in part

First
Second
Third
Fourth
Fifth
Sixth
Seventh

114
45
59
6
2
314
38

8
7
3
2
0
23
10

2
1
0
0
2
9
0

Dismissed
7
196
9
41
11
49
8

Remanded

Other

2
11
14
17
29
8
12

Under 28 U.S.C. § 2253, a person seeking habeas corpus relief from
state custody or seeking relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, which governs motions
challenging the lawfulness of federal custody, must seek a certificate of
appealability to appeal the denial of relief. See Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473,
484 (2000) (describing standard for obtaining certificate of appealability).
181 JUDICIAL BUSINESS 2017 tbl.B-5.
182 Table 9 reports the IDB’s “OUTCOME” field for those decisions
terminated on the merits (“DISP” is “2”). FJC Appeals Codebook, at 10-11.
The “OUTCOME” field is not used for original proceedings. Id. at 10.
180
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Eighth
Ninth
Tenth
Eleventh

92
240
20
44

3
28
2
17

1
2
0
2

12
263
2
78

7
14
2
8

01
0
0
4

123
368
5
335

TOTAL

974
(26.7%)

103
(2.8%)

19
(0.5%)

676
(18.6%)

124
(3.4%)

10
(0.2%)

1734
(47.6%)

Similarly, the merits terminations arising from original
proceedings also include some favorable results (more than 10%
were granted), even though the vast majority (over 85%) were not
favorable to the petitioner. That so many granted decisions in
original proceedings are missing may be especially problematic for
those who file the most common type of original proceeding
missing from the dataset: a request to file a second or successive
habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b). More than 86%
of the missing entries in original proceedings involve requests
under § 2244(b). Table 9 identifies the outcomes in missing
termination decisions from original proceedings.
Table 9: Outcomes in Original Proceedings in
Missing Entries183
Fed. Cir.
Dismissed/
Granted
Denied
Ct.
Other
First
6
63
4
Second
6
128
2
Third
9
216
5
Fourth
6
179
1
Fifth
7
281
3
Sixth
39
303
2
Seventh
7
103
9
Eighth
10
355
2
Ninth
186
412
15
Tenth
7
60
0
Eleventh
10
247
46
TOTAL

293
(10.7%)

2347
(86.0%)

89
(3.3%)

What’s missing, ultimately, is what many frequent users of
commercial databases might miss the least: claims brought by
vulnerable litigants against the government. I will discuss the
implications of this finding in Part III, but, for now, I will observe
that the harm from missing decisions may be asymmetrical—

This table identifies the “OPDISP” field in the FJC IDB among those
missing entries that involve original proceedings. See FJC Appeals Codebook,
at 12.
183
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exacerbating inequities already present within a system that makes
it much more difficult for unrepresented litigants and prisoners to
obtain relief. The government may be aware of a missing decision
because its attorneys have litigated the issue before, but the
prisoner will have great difficulty finding relevant missing
authority (because it will not be available on court websites or,
should they have access, in commercial databases or volumes of
the Federal Reporter or Federal Appendix). Missing decisions
ultimately require a certain level of inside knowledge to find—
knowledge that most unrepresented litigants likely lack.
C. Results
This Section describes the main findings from the matched
pair dataset for merits terminations—that is, the results based on
what was found in Bloomberg Law’s Court Opinions database
and matched to information in the FJC’s IDB. These results
should be understood against the backdrop of what’s missing
from the dataset, because inclusion of those missing decisions
may only deepen the disparities discussed below. Any
examination of the output of the federal appellate courts’ second
tier process is necessarily tentative and incomplete without that
dataset. Nevertheless, these data offer some insights and
observable trends that suggest our understanding of a two-tier
system of federal appellate justice may be incomplete: there may
be, instead, three tiers of decisional quality and process.
This section begins with a high-level summary of findings and
limitations. It then explains those findings in greater depth—first
by comparing this dataset with the longitudinal work of the Gluck
Study before turning to this project’s unique contribution to the
study of unpublished decisions. Part III will separately consider
the implications of these findings.
1. Summary of Findings and Limitations
This study suggests that unpublished decisions are not all
created equal. Controlling for outcome, oral argument, and
publication status, pro se or unrepresented litigants are more likely
to receive unpublished decisions half the length of similarly
situated counseled appeals. That these disparities exist even when
a large volume of unrepresented appeals cannot be included—
because the decisions are missing from commercial databases—
only underscores the likely extent of the disparity.
This work also demonstrates significant differences in
unpublished decisions across the circuits. For example, the
difference in decisional length in unpublished affirmances is more
than five times greater in circuits with the most robust decisions
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compared to the circuits with the shortest decisions. Those
differences exist for no obvious reason.184 Some differences may
reflect circuit culture, adding to our understanding of how “circuit
personalities,”185 may shape litigation experience on the ground.
Ultimately, these findings suggest that in some—if not in
most circuits—there may be three tiers of federal appellate review:
a first tier for the system’s “haves” and the most “important” or
interesting cases; a second tier for the system’s “haves” who have
lawyers but present routine, boring, or easy issues; and a third tier
for the system’s “have-nots” who are unrepresented. Put
differently, the results here suggest that the triage decision, which
funnels certain kinds of cases to staff attorneys, may have a
disparate effect even within the class of unpublished decisions.
Now, for the limitations. First, consistent with other studies
of this type, this work relies on word count as a proxy for reasongiving.186 But it is only a proxy. Data gathered relying on more
subjective assessments of the strength of a decision’s reasongiving correlate with the mean word count of unpublished
decisions in each circuit.187 Although there was greater
disagreement among coders on this more subjective measure, and
thus it has not be used to supplement the word-count data, the
strength of the correlation generally suggests that fewer words are
more likely to reflect thinner reasoning.
184 See RICHMAN & REYNOLDS, INJUSTICE, supra note 18, at 94 (arguing
that it’s unlikely that “caseload differences, either in number or kind account
for the[se] differences” in how courts use shortcut procedures and asserting
that while some “experimentation” may be “tolerable,” there’s “no apparent
reason” for these differences); see also McAlister, Rebuilding, supra note 3, at
1182-86 (considering the extent to which docket composition may affect use
of oral argument and unpublished decisions across the circuits).
185 See generally Larsen & Devins, supra note 15 (arguing that circuits have
unique personalities that are important counter-weights to increased judicial
partisanship).
186 Gluck, et al., supra note 2, at 70 n.260 (using word count “[a]s a proxy
for how much reasoning unpublished opinions contain” and noting that “[t]he
word count of an opinion, of course is only a rough proxy for whether an
opinion is in fact ‘well-reasoned’”). I note that, unlike the Gluck Study, id. at
70 n.261, this work excludes header material in its word counts. I note, further,
that this category of coding had a low error rate in a random cross-check of
396 fields of data (only 4 such disagreements, based, primarily on whether a
concurrence or dissent had been included).
187 The Pearson coefficient between average word count of unpublished
decisions in each circuit and the number of decisions hand-coded as lacking
independent reasoning is -.53, which suggests a strong negative correlation
between word count and reason-giving (that is to say that fewer average words
correlates with fewer overall decisions with independent reason giving). See
JACOB COHEN, STATISTICAL POWER ANALYSIS FOR THE BEHAVIORAL
SCIENCES 82 (2d ed. 1988) (stating that where Pearson correlation coefficient
is greater than .5, it reflects a strong correlation).
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Second, the existence of missing decisions is also a limitation.
The absence of these decisions from the dataset—many of which
are likely to be shorter and more perfunctory than the
unpublished decisions included—may well skew the results in
meaningful ways. To the extent inclusion of those data would
change the story, there’s every reason to believe it would likely
change the story for the worse. Based on the nature of what’s
missing, and the reason why shorter forms of decisions may be
excluded from court websites,188 it is reasonable to assume that
inclusion of what’s missing likely would exacerbate existing
differences in decisional length observed in decisions in
unrepresented and represented appeals. The discussion above
demonstrates that the missing decisions mostly affect
unrepresented and other vulnerable litigants and likely involve
more “summary” adjudications.
Third, it’s entirely possible that there are other meaningful
differences between unrepresented appeals and represented
appeals within the second tier for which this study cannot account
but that may explain the disparity seen. I believe that the richness
of the data—it contains more than 4,700 direct comparative
observations in counseled and unrepresented appeals from the
second tier—supports the assertions made here, but I have not
accounted for any difference in relative complexity between
counseled and unrepresented appeals within the second tier. Put
differently, this study assumes that there is no meaningful
difference in complexity between unrepresented and counseled
appeals that do not go to oral argument and end in unpublished
affirmances. But that’s only an assumption, and one with which
not all may agree.
Finally, this study is limited in time. That said, I have no
reason to think the period studied—the first six months of
2017—is aberrational. In Appendix B, I contextualize the data
within five-year means to demonstrate the sample’s consistency
with overall trends.189 The trends are also consistent, generally,
with the longitudinal work of another recent student, which used
a significantly larger dataset of FJC data but a substantially smaller
coded sample.190 At the very least, I have confidence that this
work is a snapshot in time that accurately describes the decisional
practices of the courts of appeals during the first six months of
2017.

188 See Gluck, et al., supra note 2, at 10, 21, 45-46 (discussing different
decisional schemes and how some types of decisions, especially those related
to summary orders, are not made available on court websites).
189 See infra Appendix B tbl.1-B.
190 Gluck, et al., supra note 2, at 46.
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2. Comparison with Other Studies
My results here are consistent with recent work by Abbe
Gluck and her colleagues that evaluated certain features of
unpublished federal appellate decisions based on aggregate IDB
data from 2008 to January 2020.191 The Gluck Study included
nearly 420,000 terminations from IDB data, supplemented by a
hand-coded sample containing approximately 1,400 observations
across six circuits.192 This project provides a closer examination
of all decisions issued across all geographic circuits for a limited
period within the longitudinal reach of the Gluck Study.193 This
Article’s hand-coded dataset with more than 11,000 observations
allows for a comparative account within unpublished decisions
and across the circuits that the Gluck Study does not address. The
work is complementary; it both confirms and deepens the
discussion of disparity that emerges from the Gluck Team’s work,
and it offers a more comprehensive account of the interplay
between and among the circuits.
But it is important to underscore that my findings are
consistent with some of the key insights of the Gluck project. This
study’s overall word count comparison between published and
unpublished decisions is consistent with the Gluck Team’s
findings, which compared word length of published and
unpublished decisions through 2017.194 They pegged the mean
word count for published decisions since 2010 at approximately
5,000 words, whereas the mean length of unpublished decisions
has been consistently at or near 1,000 words since 1991.195 They
conclude that “unpublished opinions are usually a fraction of the
length of published opinions—about one-fifth on average in
recent years from 2010 on.”196 This study’s observations are
consistent. Across all unpublished decisions in the dataset, the
mean word count is 962; the mean word count for published
decisions is 4,607.
The rates of publication for unrepresented and represented
appeals across both studies are similar, as well. In the Gluck Study,
“just 2.1% of unrepresented” appellants received published

Id. at 42 n.189.
Id. at 46-47.
193 This work occurred in parallel, and I was unaware of the Gluck Team’s
findings until publication of their article in May 2022.
194 Id. at 47-48, 70-71. The Gluck Study analyzed (through an automated
process) the total word count of just under 600,000 federal appellate decisions
issued between 1991 and 2017 to derive their word count data.
195 Id. at 71 & fig.17.
196 Id. at 40.
191
192
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decisions.197 In this study’s sample, 2.9% or 133 of 4,606 merits
terminations involving unrepresented litigants resulted in
published decisions. Conversely, 27.9% or 1,792 of 6,415
terminations involving represented appellants resulted in
published decisions. The Gluck Study concluded that
“unrepresented appellants were twelve times less likely to receive
a published opinion than appellants represented by counsel.”198
For this study, unrepresented litigants were slightly less than ten
times less likely to receive a published decision—a difference for
which the missing decisions could account (because the Gluck
Study used aggregate FJC data for this finding and not the
universe of matched pairs discussed here).
Ultimately, the Gluck Study concluded that the
disproportionate rates of publication between unrepresented and
represented appellants “merits further investigation.”199 They
recognized that “[n]eutral explanations for this differential
treatment may exist,”200 but that “bias could be another
explanation” for the disparities observed.201 This work suggests
one answer to that important question by demonstrating that even
where represented parties raise routine, non-novel, or easy issues,
they still seemingly receive more attention from the courts. That
finding increases the possibility that bias—or inequities built into
the triage system itself—may partly drive observed disparities.
3. Findings in Greater Depth
This section explores in greater depth the main claim of this
Article: if the second tier is full of “easy” cases, the courts of
appeals differ markedly in how much reasoning they provide in
“easy” cases. Not all “easy” cases are treated alike, and circuits are
not alike in how they treat “easy” cases. To be sure, we might
expect some disparities or differences within the second tier and
across the courts of appeals. But the extent of the disparities
observed, and the risks they pose, raise significant concerns about
equal access to justice, law development, transparency, and litigant
dignity. Before turning to these implications in Part III, this
section details the observed disparities within and across the
courts of appeals in how they resolve second-tier appeals.

Id. at 37.
Id.
199 Id. at 52.
200 Id. Among those “[n]eutral explanations” are the possibility that such
appeals are “less likely to raise meritorious claims or novel issues” or that they
involve “poor advocacy.” Id. at 52-53.
201 Id. at 53.
197
198
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Let’s begin by examining the differences among the courts of
appeals in how much written attention they give to second-tier
appeals compared to first-tier appeals by comparing word length
across the circuits in published and unpublished decisions. At its
most stark, consider the Fourth Circuit and the Sixth Circuit: the
mean word count for unpublished affirmances issued on the
briefs in the Fourth Circuit is 392; in the Sixth Circuit, it’s 1,965.
That’s five times as long as the decisions in the Foruth Circuit.
And that’s far from the only difference in how courts approach
unpublished decisions—and published decisions, for that matter.
Figure 7, below, compares the mean word counts for published
and unpublished decisions across the circuits, whereas Figure 8
more closely examines the mean word counts for unpublished
decisions across the circuits.
Figure 7: Mean Word Counts in All Published and
Unpublished Decisions Across the Circuits
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Figure 8: Mean Word Counts in All Unpublished
Decisions Across the Circuits
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Recall that we’re missing a substantial number of decisions
from the Sixth Circuit and the Eleventh Circuit, which might
lower these particularly high means (compared to other circuits).
But another outlier here—the Tenth Circuit—has particularly
good coverage. It also happens to be the least busy federal
appellate court (in terms of filings per judge)202 and the only court
where judges perform all triage decisions themselves. If the adage
that, with more time, one would write a shorter letter, is true, it
seems not to hold much sway in the context of unpublished
decisions. More reasoning, and thus longer decisions, may reflect
greater judicial (or staff) effort and provide a more robust
precedential (or quasi-precedential) foundation across more areas
of the law. Less is not always more, when it comes to unpublished
decisionmaking, where the temptation may be to say as little as
possible to save time.
The differences across the circuit do not end there. Disparities
in how courts resolve appeals within the second tier of appellate
process also appear to exist. Even where an appeal does not
receive oral argument, is affirmed, and results in an unpublished
decision, appellants who are represented by counsel receive
decisions nearly twice the length of those who are unrepresented.
Removing criminal appeals from the group of represented

202 See McAlister, Rebuilding, supra note 3, at 1211 tbl.17; id. at 1160
(discussing Tenth Circuits screening process); see also Larsen & Devins, supra
note 12, at 11-12 (discussing triage process in Tenth Circuit and noting that
judges consider screening to be “their most urgent task”).
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appellants (and thus comparing civil appeals to civil appeals)
deepens the disparity. Adding proceedings involving denials of
certificates of appealability (which functions as an affirmance in a
habeas corpus proceeding), does not meaningfully change the
story. The bottom line: on average, a unrepresented litigant is
more likely to receive a shorter decision disposing of her appeal
than a represented party (even when neither receives oral
argument, a published decision, or a victory). Figure 9 identifies
average word counts in all merits terminations across the circuits
based on representation status (and controlling for outcome, oral
argument, and publication status).
Figure 9: Word Count Comparisons in “Easy” Cases
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What drives these differences, it appears, are significant
differences at both the high and low ends of the distribution.
Figure 10 identifies the relative frequency of decisions in certain
length ranges up to decision over 1,500 words. In most ranges,
there’s an observable disparity between appeals involving
represented appellants (dark gray) and appeals involving
unrepresented appellants (light gray), but the discrepancies are
particularly pronounced at the high and low ends of the
distribution.
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Figure 10: Frequency of Decisions Within Word Count
Bands in Represented and Unrepresented “Easy” Appeals
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Differences exist within circuit decisional practices, too; in
some circuits there’s little meaningful difference between how
courts resolve unrepresented appeals and represented appeals; in
others, the difference is stark. Figure 11 graphically depicts the
difference between average word counts across the circuits
between represented (dark gray) and unrepresented (light gray)
appellants, whereas Table 10 details the mean word count and
number of observations (n) across the circuits for represented and
unrepresented second-tier appellants.203

These figures do not include denials of certificates of appealability; they
thus compare only decisions issued in appeals as of right depending on the
representation status of the appellant only (and they include criminal and civil
appeals). Note that above in Figure 9, and below in Table 10, I have used all
circuit means to reflect the total number of words in all similarly situated
counseled and unrepresented terminations, divided by the total number of such
terminations, which should mitigate the effect of some extreme outliers with
few observations.
203
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Figure 11: Average Word Counts in Represented and
Unrepresented “Easy” Appeals Across the Circuits
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Table 10: Average Word Count in
Unpublished Affirmances Issued
Without Oral Argument
Based on Representation Status
Fed. Cir. Ct. Represented Unrepresented
D.C.
894 (n=20)
301 (n=62)
First
1471 (n=25)
171 (n=13)
Second
985 (n=181)
832 (n=70)
Third
1931 (n=162) 1170 (n=199)
Fourth
621 (n=370)
178 (n=392)
Fifth
617 (n=332)
552 (n=247)
Sixth
2201 (n=209) 1610 (n=144)
Seventh
487 (n=3)
1034 (n=95)
Eighth
818 (n=94)
218 (n=155)
Ninth
444 (n=580)
346 (n=527)
Tenth
2186 (n=106) 1366 (n=109)
Eleventh
1600 (n=479) 1450 (n=162)
Mean Across
All Circuits

1084
(n=2561)

666
(n=2175)

Some of these differences, and the low number of observations,
reflect the effect of missing decisions.204 But, again, it’s unlikely

204 The First Circuit is a good example. We’re missing at least 120 decisions
involving pro se appeals from that circuit. Other work indicates the mean word
count for these decisions is 249 words; the median is 140. See McAlister,
Missing, supra note 12, at 1144 tbl.10. In other words, I’m confident that the
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that including what’s missing would make the picture better; it’s
more likely that what’s missing are the poorest quality decisions
with the least reasoning, as those are more likely to be issued
through a summary procedure and not as written opinions.205
More than 30% of the unrepresented appeals involving
appeals of right (and thus not including certificates of
appealability in habeas corpus proceedings) involved prisoner
claims. The mean word count in those 710 appeals was 638. There
were 90 counseled appeals involving prisoners among the dataset
of “easy” cases, and those appeals generated substantially longer
decisions, with an average word count of 1455. In some circuits,
like the Eleventh Circuit, the difference was especially sharp (an
average word count of 2,702 in prisoner cases with counsel and
1,274 in cases without counsel). In other circuits, the presence of
counsel seemed to make no difference, as all prisoners received
perfunctory decisions: in the Eighth Circuit, the average word
count for all prisoner appeals was only 99.206
Admittedly, these results are not nearly as dramatic as the
difference in length between published and unpublished
decisions, which is closer to one-fifth as opposed to one-half.207
But bear in mind that we’re already looking within the second tier,
where judicial time and attention is slight, and the decisions are
more perfunctory, overall. None of these appeals went to oral
argument. None has been designated for publication or is
precedential. And it’s likely that many have been written by staff
attorneys (and perhaps even rubber-stamped by a judge). These
data suggest that, in conducting that limited review for error
correction in second-tier appeals, the judge who reviews a staff
attorney or law clerk’s recommendation will generally have lessreasoned decisions to review for approving a result in an
unrepresented appeal than in a counseled appeal. And there could
be cascading effects: future unrepresented litigants may have less

disparities we see would persist (and perhaps even deepen) were missing
decisions included.
205 For a more thorough discussion of how decisions may go missing based
on the different types of decisional outputs in at least one circuit, see McAlister,
Missing, supra note 12, at 1137-40.
206 The n here is small, of course; there were 46 unrepresented prisoner
appeals (excluding certificates of appealability) and only two with counsel in
the Eighth Circuit; in the Eleventh Circuit, there were more counseled prisoner
appeals (18) and 48 unrepresented appeals.
207 Of course, comparing the word count in published unrepresented
appeals to published decisions is even more dramatic: in this study
unrepresented appellants received decisions that were approximately 14% the
length of published decisions.
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guidance, should they pursue similar claims, and the law may
develop more slowly in these areas over time.
One may argue that these are not apples-to-apples
comparisons, because the nature of the suit and the types of
claims may be different across represented and unrepresented
proceedings. That’s undoubtedly true (and also sort of the point).
Ultimately, however, those differences are exceedingly difficult to
quantify. The constants here—oral argument, publication status,
and outcome—are meant as proxies for “easy” cases. If the
animating presumption in sending unrepresented cases to the
second tier by default, or in publishing decisions in those cases at
a fraction of the rate of represented appeals, is that these cases are
“easy” or “routine,” then it’s helpful to compare “easy” cases to
“easy” cases based on the treatment they received. That easy
unrepresented cases receive less reasoned decisions even within
that second tier suggests that, perhaps, what these decisions look
like may have less to do with the merits than with possible bias
towards unrepresented (and prisoner) litigants. Put it this way: if
all of these appeals are losers, why should the reasoning in one
class of appeals be, on average, substantially thinner than in the
other class of appeals?
Now, it’s still possible that unrepresented appeals have a
higher rate of frivolity than even similarly situated second-tier,
counseled appeals. Were that true, it would presumably be a
neutral reason for any disparate treatment of unrepresented
litigants (compared to those with counsel). Again, that’s also a
reason that’s difficult to test. But here’s one indication that the
presumption of frivolity and litigiousness around unrepresented
litigants may be overblown. On average, unrepresented litigants
are no more likely than average to seek rehearing or file a cert
petition after a loss. For all merits terminations during the study
period, the rate of rehearing was 19.2%, which means I observed
2,128 rehearing (or rehearing en banc) petitions filed from 11,065
merits terminations. The rehearing rate where the appellant was
unrepresented at termination was roughly similar: 20.5% or 946
rehearing petitions were filed in 4,606 unrepresented merits
terminations. The same was true for petitions for writs of
certiorari to the Supreme Court of the United States.208 The
overall rate for seeking certiorari review was 12.9% (or in 1,432

208 Compared to represented litigants whose appeal did not receive oral
argument or a published decision (that is, second tier represented appellants),
the rate of seeking rehearing in unrepresented appeals was higher. Only 369 of
3144 similarly situated represented appellants or 11.7% filed for rehearing
(compared to 20.5%). The rate for filing cert petitions was roughly equivalent
(348 cert petitions filed out of 3144 merits terminations or 11.1%).
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of 11,065 merits terminations); the rate for those who were
unrepresented at termination was 11.4% (or 526 of 4,606
terminations). To be sure, it’s possible that unrepresented
appellants are less familiar with post-decision options for review
than those appellants with counsel, and that more would file for
such relief if they knew it were available, but this is at least some
indicia that unrepresented appellants are no more given to
frivolous filings than other kinds of appellants.
There may be other, neutral reasons to treat appeals with
similar merit (or lack thereof) differently, but the effects may lead
to something of a self-fulfilling prophecy: by writing shorter
decisions and issuing more unpublished decisions in some areas
of the law than in others, it will be harder for those bringing
similar claims to find useful precedent. The law will retard, and it
will retard more quickly in some circuits than in others. Compare
the experience of the unrepresented appellant in the Fourth
Circuit or the Eighth Circuit to the experience in the Tenth Circuit
or the Eleventh Circuit: in the latter, the appellant is more likely
to receive a decision ten times as long as in the former. The
difference between those types of decisions is as significant as the
difference between published and unpublished decisions
themselves. The outcome in that unrepresented appellants’ case
represents the bottom rung of federal appellate procedure. The
next Part explains why we should care about the bottom rung,
and what we might do to ameliorate it.
III. WHY WE SHOULD CARE,
AND WHAT WE CAN DO ABOUT IT
That the “easiest” cases percolating through the federal
appellate courts receive the least written attention is neither
controversial nor groundbreaking. At least not anymore—it’s
been that way for decades; that’s why we have published and
unpublished decisions, in the first place. And few if any—
including me—would suggest that all appeals should receive the
same treatment or amount of attention from very busy courts. But
what these data suggest is that it’s not just that “easy” cases are
getting less, but that particular kinds of “easy” cases, in particular
circuits, are getting much less. At its most extreme, consider this:
the average represented appellant in the Tenth Circuit receives an
unpublished decision more than twelve times as long as an
unrepresented appellant in the Fourth Circuit. That’s far more
written attention for the represented appellant in one circuit than
for an unrepresented appellant in another. That disparity raises a
host of concerns about law development, equality, dis-uniformity,
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and litigant experience across the federal appellate courts.209 This
Part explains why we should care about these inequities, and it
offers some solutions.
A. Why the Disparities Matter
If we judge the health of our institutions by how they treat the
least powerful among us, then the triage regime needs a check-up.
We might disagree about the prescriptions, but hopefully we’re
moving towards agreement about the basic need for an
examination. The facts on the ground demonstrate that our
federal appellate courts are a system of haves and have-nots—and
that depends not only on the resources of the appealing party but,
also, the court that hears the appeal.
The results discussed here are a call to action: they reveal
potentially intolerable systemic inequities within the federal
appellate courts’ existing triage regime. The disparities are at least
two-fold: first, there’s the difference in how many courts seem to
be treating cases that are superficially alike (that is, how dismissive
courts are of “easy” cases) and then, perhaps even more
problematic, how uneven that treatment is across the circuits. The
latter may be leading to the former: circuit disparities in reasoning
may be driving the trends observed in how courts address
unrepresented appeals overall.
Circuits have different cultures and norms,210 and those
distinctions may be important to the vitality of the institutions
themselves. Allison Orr Larsen and Neal Devins, two esteemed
chroniclers of the federal courts, have recently argued that “circuit
personalities” are essential bulwarks against rising judicial
partisanship.211 But there is a difference between cultivation of

209 See Gluck, et al., supra note 2, at 94 (asserting that publication practices
should be assessed through the lens of judicial system values, principally
“development of the law, equal treatment, dignity, transparency, efficiency, and
perceived legitimacy”).
210 See also Levy, Mechanics, supra note 19, at 319 (observing that “the
mechanics of the federal courts of appeals . . . vary so greatly”); Stefanie A.
Lindquist, Bureaucratization and Balkanization: The Origins and Effects of DecisionMaking Norms in the Federal Appellate Courts, 41 U. RICH. L. REV. 659, 662 (2007)
(recognizing substantial “differentiation in the processing of individual
appeals” and “adaptations to caseload growth” have created “substantial
variation in the norms governing the appellate process across the circuit”); see
also Michael E. Solimine, Judicial Stratification and the Reputations of the United States
Courts of Appeals, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1331, 1352 (2005) (“Over time, circuits
appear to implicitly develop cultures that manifest themselves in various
ways.”).
211 Larsen & Devins, supra note 15, at 8 (observing that “unique traditions
foster bipartisanship relationships and a joint commitment to the rule of law”).
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vibrant and unique circuit cultures that provide interconnection
and collegiality and circuit cultures that seemingly tolerate the
deterioration of adjudicative and process values. We can
encourage the former without tolerating the latter.212
These data reveal some uncomfortable disparities—
disparities that may be produced by and perpetuated through
circuit triage regimes. Take, for example, the data from the Third
Circuit, where the average word count in represented appeals
without oral argument and publication is nearly 2,000 words
(twice the national average) and in similar unrepresented appeals
it’s closer to 1,170—consistent with the disparities observed
nationally (but way batter than what any litigant receives, on
average, from any unpublished decision issued by the Fourth
Circuit). There’s reason to think the Third Circuit’s unique triage
regime contributes to that disparity, as its judges set many cases
for oral argument (only later to remove them), while it sends
unrepresented appeals to staff attorneys (and standing panels) by
default.213 The judges handle cases set for argument, even if they
ultimately remove them from the argument calendar, by
dispositions drafted in chambers.214 There’s every reason to think
that some of what these data show is the difference in reasongiving between triage by default for unrepresented litigants and
judicial resolution for represented appeals.
Of course, the seeming quality of decisionmaking from the
Third Circuit, overall, might well make other circuits—like the
Fourth or Eighth or Ninth Circuits—blush. The effort the Third
Circuit extends in unrepresented appeals—to say nothing of
represented appeals—dwarfs the output in other circuits. The
average word count in the Third Circuit for unrepresented appeals
is more than six times the average length of unrepresented appeals
in the Fourth Circuit, for example. It’s hard to imagine what might
justify that kind of disparity as a circuit value. And if the Third
212 Marin Levy made a similar point when recognizing that uniformity in
circuit case management practices is neither obtainable nor desirable. Levy,
Mechanics, supra note 19, at 382-83. “[D]eep value disuniformity,” she asserted
“may be indefensible, [and] would mean the resulting priority disuniformity
may also be problematic.” The problem, of course, as Levy recognized, is that
we have little transparency into the values that may animate some of the
differences we observe. Id. at 383-84 (“to improve current court practices and
facilitate discussions about how practices relate to the courts’ underlying
values, greater transparency and information sharing among the circuits are
needed”). Levy, Larsen, Devins, and Linquist have all done much to educate
us about these differences.
213 See Levy, Mechanics, supra note 19, at 357-58 (discussing Third Circuit’s
triage process).
214 Id. at 358 (cases that go on oral argument calendar, even if later
removed, “are decided in dispositions drafted in chambers”).
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Circuit has prioritized reason-giving as one of its circuit values,
it’s equally difficult to imagine why that should not be a shared
value across all circuits—as a matter of transparency, equality, and
litigant dignity.
The comparison between the Third Circuit and the Fourth
Circuit draws to light another point: if seemingly “neutral” (or
non-discriminatory) reasons—like poorer briefing or more
frivolous filings—produce systemic disparities between
represented and unrepresented appellants, what acceptable,
“neutral” reasons might account for the disparities observed
across circuits? It’s highly unlikely that the Fourth Circuit sees
demonstrably more meritless unrepresented appeals than its
neighboring circuit.215 Indeed, it’s difficult to resist the conclusion
that the difference between these two circuits confirms that
disparities between represented and unrepresented litigants result,
at least in part, from cultural disdain for unrepresented
appellants216—a disdain that may be particularly great in the
Fourth Circuit, which sees a larger share of unpresented appeals
than any other circuit.217
The stability over time that the Gluck Study describes in the
length of unpublished decisions—compared, that is, to published
decisions, which have swelled—underscores these observations
about decisional disparities.218 The average length of unpublished
decisions has held steady at around 1,000 words for twenty-six
years.219 That suggests there’s a floor for decisional length that
assures sufficient reason-giving to communicate key facts and the
basis for the court’s decision to the parties,220 and that floor is
215 Both see rates of unrepresented appeals above fifty percent, but the
Fourth Circuit’s rate is the highest in the nation (60.7%). See McAlister,
Rebuilding, supra note 3, at 1185 tbl.7 (citing JUDICIAL BUSINESS 2020 tbl.B-9
and preceding years).
216 See Adam Liptak, An Exit Interview with Richard Posner, Judicial Provocateur,
N.Y. Times (Sept. 11, 2017) (quoting former federal appellate judge Richard
Posner as saying that “most judges regard these people [meaning
unrepresented and indigent litigants] as kind of trash not worth the time of a
federal judge”).
217 See supra note 215.
218 See Gluck, et al., supra note 2, at 71 & fig.17.
219 Id. at 71 (identifying mean word court for federal appellate decisions by
publication status between 1991 and 2017 and observing that “mean word
count of unpublished opinions has remained around 1,000 words” during that
time).
220 This was the stated goal from the early days of non-publication. A 1968
memorandum from the Chief Judge of the Fourth Circuit explained that
unpublished decisions would be “succinct[]” but “always adequately[] state[]
the facts, the contentions, and the reasons for the conclusion,” even when the
appeal was “frivolous.” Jones v. Superintendent, Va. State Farm, 465 F.2d
1091, 1095 (4th Cir. 1972) (attaching memorandum).
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somewhere around 1,000 words. That some courts fall well below
that floor provides a reasonable basis to conclude that the reasons
they offer some litigants are meaningfully thinner than those
offered to others, in other circuits.
We should be especially concerned that the triage system’s
results appear to impose uneven burdens on the system’s most
vulnerable (and most frequent) litigants. The risk for dignitary
harm is great—especially when these litigants may lack other
resources for recourse against governmental abuses.221 Consider
the message decisions like those from the Fourth Circuit in
Appendix A send. Imagine being on the receiving end of a
decision stamped “not precedential” or “not intended for
publication” or “summary” that contains a scant 200 words. To
be sure, one can say a lot with a few words. Perhaps less is more
should be the norm, but it’s not.222 To the contrary, modern
courts appear to view the amount of ink spilled as positively
correlated with a case’s importance.223 And where litigants have
no other touchpoints with a court, it’s difficult not to rely on the
written decision as the only measure of judicial engagement with
the arguments on appeal. If you received this hypothetical 200word decision, what assurance would you have—having had no
other interaction with the court that issued it—that the court really
read your briefs and considered your arguments?
Even for those unmoved by litigant dignity or equality
concerns, the disparities discussed threaten the uniform
development of the law. The risk of systemic nonpublication,
coupled with demonstrably shorter unpublished decisions in

See Anne Morrison Piehl & Margo Schlanger, Determinants of Civil Rights
Filings in Federal District Court by Jail and Prison Inmates, 1 J. EMPIRICAL L. STUD.
79, 79 (2004) (“The only universal accountability mechanism is the inmate
lawsuit seeking damages or some kind of remedial action for injury inflicted by
official misconduct.”).
222 See Gluck, et al., supra note 2, at 71-72 & fig.17 (observing that published
decisions have become longer since a rule-change permitted citation to
unpublished decisions and hypothesizing that “courts may be issuing more
time-saving unpublished opinions because of the greater time they have chosen
to spend on drafting published opinions”); see also Meg Penrose, Enough Said:
A Proposal for Shortening Supreme Court Opinions, 18 SCRIBES J. L. WRITING 49,
52-56 (2019) (cataloguing and critiquing the verbose Roberts Court).
223 See Adam Liptak, Justices Are Long on Words but Short on Guidance, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 17, 2010, https://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/18/us/
18rulings.html (comparing decision in Brown v. Board of Education, which had
fewer than 4,000 words with the 2007 decision in Parents Involved v. Seattle,
another school desegregation case, reached 47,000 words; observing that
median length of decisions in 1950s was around 2,000 and by 2010 it was
4,751).
221
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some circuits, may undermine even-handed law development.224
Even though unpublished decisions do not formally bind courts,
they are a valuable source of persuasive authority that impact the
development of law. Elsewhere, I’ve identified helpful
unpublished decisions that are missing from commercial
databases225—a problem that this study only underscores, given
the pervasive problem of missing decisions for unrepresented
appellants discussed in Part II. Unpublished decisions can make
“important contributions to common law,”226 and recent work
confirms that at least some unpublished decisions are cited
frequently.227 There’s reason, then, to care about what
unpublished decisions look like, how reasoned they are, and how
they might be used differentially across the circuits.
These concerns are especially great in the context of
unrepresented appeals, which predominately involve prisoner
claims.228 Not only are these decisions harder to find, but the
reasoning may well be thinner and less useful—to future courts,
to constitutional actors, and to the prisoners themselves. The
consequence of this under-development for civil rights law is
especially great, where, as Alan Trammell has observed, “litigation
rests on the premise that law indeed becomes settled . . . [, and
that] [c]itizens may rely on the eminently reasonable assumption
that officials will abide by settled law, and they may seek
compensation when officials fail to do so.”229 Systematic under-

See Gluck, et al., supra note 2, at 95 (“[I]f courts issue non-precedential
opinions more frequently in certain subject areas than others, the law could
develop in a lop-sided manner.”).
225 McAlister, Missing Decisions, supra note 12, at 1149-51 (discussing Jones v.
Gelb, a missing decision from First Circuit, and arguing that some missing
decisions are significant and worth finding and using).
226 Denise M. Keele, Robert W. Malmsheimer, Donalad W. Floyed &
Lianjun Zhang, An Analysis of Ideological Effects in Published Versus Unpublished
Judicial Opinions, 6 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 213, 218 (2009).
227 To be sure, unpublished decisions are cited far less frequently than
published counterparts, especially by courts, but it’s undoubtedly also the case
that “some unpublished opinions are sufficeitnly reasoned to be useful to
litigants and courts.” Gluck, et al., supra note 2, at 87; see id. at 85-86 (observing
a ratio of “approximately thirty citations to a published opinion for ever
citation to an unpublished opinion” but also finding that litigants cited to
unpublished decisions in their briefs nearly 70% of the time in at least some
circuits with high nonpublication rates).
228 See McAlister, “Downright Indifference,” supra note 14, at 556
(demonstrating that 47% of all unrepresented appeals involve prisoner claims
and another 18% —most of which are also prisoner claims—involve original
proceedings).
229 Alan M. Trammell, Demystifying Nationwide Injunctions, 98 TEX. L. REV.
67, 119 (2019); see also Trammell, supra note 9, at 989 (recognizing that
“precedents create affirmative legal obligations for state officials, even if those
officials were not parties to the precedent-making lawsuits”).
224
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publishing and under-reasoning in certain areas of the law, and in
certain courts, threatens to undermine the very development of
“settled law” on which our civil rights enforcement regime
rests.230
It may also produce inefficiencies for the courts themselves.
Better legal development, and greater access to those decisions,
will help litigants know in advance that some arguments may be
losers and other arguments are more likely to be winners. Even
ventilating meritless arguments may serve to aid in legal
development, as the public and Congress learn what issues are
emerging or recurring.231 In the long run, issuing more reasoned
decisions for more claims imposes little harm (at least where
caseload volumes are manageable), and offers substantial benefit
in law development, transparency, equality, and litigant dignity.
B. What to Do
Now for the difficult part: what to do. Not all appeals—even
those within the second tier—may be equal. That much may be
true.232 It’s equally true that judicial resources are finite. Working
within existing constraints, then, Levy is right that some form of
case management is both rational and needed.233 But how do we
decide when there’s been too much triage? And if we think there
has been too much, how much should there be? These are hard,
difficult questions, and I don’t purport to have all the answers.
But they are essential questions to ask, especially in the face of
lessening docket pressures.234 If a triage system’s primary boon is
efficiency and preservation of scarce judicial resources, how
should we recalibrate that scheme when resources (judicial time)
are seemingly more plentiful?235

230 For a thorough discussion of the concept of “settled law,” especially in
the context of federal civil rights litigation, see G. Alexander Nunn & Alan M.
Trammell, Settled Law, 107 VA. L. REV. 57 (2021).
231 See Reinert, supra note 102, at 1226-30 (discussing benefits of meritless
litigation).
232 See, e.g., Martin, supra note 32, at 183, 191 (arguing that “not all cases
are of equal merit”).
233 See supra notes 53-61 (discussing Levy’s appraisal of case-management
or triage regimes).
234 See McAlister, “Downright Indifference,” supra note 14, at 552-54
(demonstrating that caseload volume has decreased since 2005 and showing
lack of correlation between overall caseload and use of unpublished decisions).
235 One could also ask this question in the context of the possibility of
adding more judges to the federal appellate courts, too. See McAlister,
Rebuilding, supra note 3, at 1216-18 (discussing why adding judges may address
systemic deficits in distribution of judicial attention to marginalized litigants).
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Reforms must begin with transparency.236 Congress should
task each circuit court to issue periodic reports that explain, in
detail, their triage regimes (or any changes thereto) and identify
and defend the values that animate it. In that process, courts
should incorporate dissenting voices from within the court,
survey results on litigant experience (including from
unrepresented appellants), and invite and engage with the views
of district court judges who follow circuit precedent. These courts
should be asked to explain, anew, decisions to send appeals to
staff attorneys by default, especially as caseload volumes have
fallen and judicial attention has become more plentiful.
To aid in that process, and to provide more systemic
information to inform the cost-benefit calculus of triage regimes,
Congress should require the courts to report detailed statistics
annually about the results of their triage schemes, including the
percentage of cases handled primarily by judicial staff versus those
handled in chambers. This information should be sufficiently
granular to identify average word length, percentage of
publication, and percentage of oral argument by representation
status and nature of suit. Courts should be required to post these
annual reports on their websites and report such data to the
Administrative Office, which should evaluate and publicly report
on inter-circuit disparities.
These transparency reforms may have the positive effect of
prompting the courts to revisit their own procedures in the
process. That’d be good, for sure. Courts were the ones to
innovate the federal appellate triage system when it seemed most
needed; they may be well positioned to innovate it again, as the
need for triage recedes and the regime’s costs become more
apparent. Ultimately, I believe the triage system could be
reformed in ways that better account for individual litigant need—
that is, the value that litigants might assign to process itself.
Matthew Lawrence’s work discusses this possibility in the context
of triaging overwhelmed administrative review processes for
Medicare coverage determinations.237 He proposes a unique triage
regime that might ration procedure based on “the inherent value
of participation to particular claimants,” which may shift
procedural attention to frustrated beneficiaries instead of the
providers who frequently appeal.238 A framework like that—or
one that provides greater attention to disfavored appellants based

236 Reforms also should include a mandate that courts provide free access
to all merits terminations on their websites. See McAlister, Missing, supra note
12, at 1160-62 (making that recommendation).
237 See Lawrence, supra note 36, at 83.
238 Id. at 84.
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on a random lottery like the one Daniel Epps and William Ortman
have proposed for Supreme Court review239—may have net
benefits for law development, error detection, and procedural
justice. The point is that the triage regime could be recalibrated to
give judicial attention where it might matter most—not only to
the development of the law or the detection of error but also to
the litigants themselves.240
But the size of the disparities across the circuits suggest that
circuit habits may be too entrenched to expect the courts to solve
these problems on their own—no matter what innovations they
might prefer. One way to address decisional disparities that
impose uneven burdens on marginalized litigants would be to
mandate a reason-giving decisional floor by statute.241 Although
some might view that solution to be something of a
sledgehammer, it may be the kind of systemic jolt needed to
unsettle entrenched habits. Congress could require all federal
appellate decisions terminating an appeal or original proceeding
on the merits to (1) identify the issues on appeal, (2) identify and
explain relevant law, and (3) apply that law to key facts.242 Only
when a court makes a specific and detailed finding of
frivolousness might it be relieved of the burden to explain its
result, but these frivolous appeals should be identified as such and
they should be tracked and reported by the Administrative Office.
I have previously discussed the tradeoffs of a reason-giving
norm in the context of unpublished decisions and concluded that
the pros outweigh the cons.243 The goal in mandating such a
reform would be to bring uniformity to the practice of
unpublished decisions, thus ensuring that reason-giving is
consistent throughout the federal appellate courts, even when
some courts choose to issue more (or fewer) unpublished

239 Daniel Epps & William Ortman, The Lottery Docket, 116 MICH. L. REV.
705 (2018).
240 To be clear, I believe that law development and error correction should
continue to have a significant role to play in designing any triage regime; I’m
suggesting that another value—the importance of judicial attention and
process to the litigant himself—be an additional consideration in how courts
allocate attention.
241 Such requirement would likely pass constitutional muster—especially
given the plenary authority Congress has over the lower federal courts. U.S.
Const. art. III, § 1; Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 441 (1850); cf. Suzanna
Sherry, Our Kardashian Court (and How to Fix It), 106 IOWA L. REV. 181, 207-215
(2020) (arguing that requiring the Supreme Court to issue only per curiam
decisions and eliminating separate opinions is constitutional).
242 See McAlister, “Downright Indifference,” supra note 14, at 591 (arguing for
a similar reason-giving norm in unpublished decisions).
243 Id. at 583-93 (discussing and defending a reason-giving norm for federal
appellate courts).
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decisions. The development of the law—even as a source of
persuasive authority, which all unpublished decisions are—should
not suffer as a result of court preferences. Such a mandate may
create more “junk” precedent—that is, more of what Brian
Soucek has described as “copy-paste” precedent, where courts
repeatedly regurgitate inaccurate descriptions of the law in
unpublished decisions.244 Perhaps perversely, generating more such
precedent might make it easier to detect the development of
errant law of the sort that copy-paste precedent produces. But
another requirement might also stymie this risk: requiring the
appellate courts to cite to, rely upon, and quote only published
authority in their decisions;245 and, where no published decision is
on point, that may be a sign that precedential treatment is
necessary.
There’s another benefit of such a reason-giving mandate. It
might help develop a more robust legal basis to distinguish
between meritless-ness and frivolity. Doing so might provide
further guidance to litigants on the difference between the two,
and it may help reduce frivolous appeals by putting all on notice
that a particular argument is a certain loser. But distinguishing
between meritless and frivolous appeals would also help identify
and root out systemic biases. If, for example, one circuit claims it
has a substantially greater volume of frivolous appeals than
another, that might be cause for suspicion—it may be a sign of
bias against certain appellants. Courts should be forced to make
clear their view: if they’re giving short shrift to some appeals
because they are frivolous, they should be tasked with explaining
on the record why an appeal is not worth their time. Where,
however, an appeal is not demonstrably frivolous, the least we
should expect is reasoned decisionmaking—that is, an
explanation of what the appeal is about and why the party
appealing has lost. That kind of basic reason-giving requirement
will benefit all and help eliminate bottom-rung appeals.
CONCLUSION
The federal appellate regime produces measurable, observable
inequities in how it distributes procedure and judicial attention.
Those disparities affect vulnerable and marginalized litigants

See Soucek, supra note 53, at 165-171 (discussing the hazards of copying
inaccurate descriptions of the law from one nonprecedential decision to
another); see also Maggie Gardner, Dangerous Citations, 95 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1619,
1622 (2020) (discussing similar phenomenon in district court opinions).
245 This is similar to Soucek’s prescription. See Soucek, supra note 53, at
170 (“Courts should refrain from releasing unpublished opinion when the
governing legal principle either is not, or cannot, be quoted directly from a
precedential opinion.”).
244
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more than other more resourced appellants, even when both
bring “easy” appeals. These disparities, moreover, are uneven
across the circuits. In some circuits reason-giving appears, on
average, to be very poor; in others, it’s far more robust. Little
explains these differences, and their persistence may jeopardize
law development in civil rights, habeas, and immigration
appeals—areas where unpublished decisions are used frequently.
The presence of these inter-circuit disparities, alone, suggests that
bias infects the federal appellate triage regime—at least in some
circuits where disfavor towards this class of claimants may be
greater.
In an ideal world, courts would revise triage regimes on their
own; they might develop and implement reason-giving norms to
provide quality, reasoned decisions to all litigants. Some courts
appear to have done just that, if these data accurately reflect
perisistent trends. But others lag well behind their peers. Although
reason-giving atrophy was to be expected as courts shifted to an
unpublication norm, this study deomonstrates that some courts
have gone too far in eroding core decisional values. It’s time to
eliminate bottom-rung appeals, and if the courts won’t do it on
their own, then Congress should.
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APPENDIX A
The following was coded as not identifying the cause of
action; not identifying the issues on appeal; not containing
independent reasoning; and resting entirely on the district court’s
decision:
Althea Marie Hughes appeals the district
court's order dismissing her civil action for failure
to state a claim for relief, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1915 (e)(2)(B)(ii) (2012). We have reviewed the
record and find no reversible error. Accordingly,
we affirm for the reasons stated by the district
court. Hughes v. Bank of Am., No. 3:16-cv-00672HEH, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 85236 (E.D. Va.
Feb. 21, 2017). We dispense with oral argument
because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately presented in the materials before this
court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.1
The following was coded as identifying the cause of action;
not identifying the issues on appeal; not containing independent
reasoning; and resting entirely on the district court’s decision:
George Riley Altman, a federal prisoner, appeals
the district court's order accepting the
recommendation of the magistrate judge and
denying relief on his 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (2012)
petition. We have reviewed the record and find no
reversible error. Accordingly, although we grant
leave to proceed in forma pauperis, we affirm for
the reasons stated by the district court. Altman v.
Hollenbaek, No. 5:15-hc-02256-D (E.D.N.C. Jan. 30,
2017). We dispense with oral argument because the
facts and legal contentions are adequately presented
in the materials before this court and argument
would not aid the decisional process.2
The following was coded as not identifying the criminal
offense; identifying the issues on appeal; containing independent
reasoning (here, lack of jurisdiction because appellant challenges

1
2

Hughes v. Bank of Am., 691 F. App’x 92 (4th Cir. 2017).
Altman v. Hollenbaek, 691 F. App’x 98 (4th Cir. 2017).
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only a discretionary sentencing decision); and not resting entirely
on the district court’s decision:
Chandra Padgett seeks to appeal the district
court's order granting the Government’s motion in
her criminal case. Our review of the district court’s
order is governed by 18 U.S.C. § 3742 (a) (2012).
United States v. Davis, 679 F.3d 190, 193 (4th Cir.
2012). While the statute gives us “jurisdiction to
hear challenges to the lawfulness of the method
used by the district court in making its sentencing
decision,” we lack “jurisdiction to review any part of
a discretionary sentencing decision.” Id. at 194.
Because the sole issue Padgett raises on appeal
challenges the district court’s discretionary
sentencing decision, we dismiss this appeal for lack
of jurisdiction. We dispense with oral argument
because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately presented in the materials before this
court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.3
The following was coded as identifying the cause of action;
not identifying the issues on appeal; not offering independent
reasoning; and not resting exclusively on the district court’s
decision:
Robert Lee Pernell, Jr., seeks to appeal the
district court's order dismissing as untimely his 28
U.S.C. § 2255 (2012) motion. The order is not
appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a
certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253
(c)(1)(B) (2012). A certificate of appealability will
not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial
of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2)
(2012). When the district court denies relief on the
merits, a prisoner satisfies this standard by
demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find
that the district court’s assessment of the
constitutional claims is debatable or wrong. Slack v.
McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 , 120 S. Ct. 1595 , 146
L. Ed. 2d 542 (2000); see Miller El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S.
322, 336-38, 123 S. Ct. 1029, 154 L. Ed. 2d 931
(2003). When the district court denies relief on

3

United States v. Padgett, 691 F. App’x 93 (4th Cir. 2017).
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procedural grounds, the prisoner must demonstrate
both that the dispositive procedural ruling is
debatable, and that the motion states a debatable
claim of the denial of a constitutional right. Slack,
529 U.S. at 484-85.
We have independently reviewed the record and
conclude that Pernell has not made the requisite
showing. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of
appealability and dismiss the appeal. We dispense
with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the
materials before this court and argument would not
aid the decisional process.4

4

United States v. Pernell, 691 F. App’x 709 (4th Cir. 2017).
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APPENDIX B
The following Table compares the dataset’s publication and
oral argument rates to the available one-year and five-year mean
statistics for the same decisional features. It demonstrates that the
sample comports with the overall trends for the same period.
Table 1.B: Overall Profile of Dataset Compared to
Publication and Oral Argument Statistics

Fed. Cir. Matched
Ct.
Pairs

Matched
Merits
Terms.

Merits
% of Merits
5-yr 2017 Rate
Decided
Terms.
Mean
of OA2
after OA Decided after Rate of
OA
OA (SD)1

Unpub. % of Merits 5-yr Mean 2017 Rate
Merits
Terms.
Rate of
of Unpub.
Terms. Unpub. Unpub. Dec.
Dec.
(SD)3

D.C.

328

253

134

53.0%

47.1% (2.6) 51.6%

137

54.2%

60.0% (4.3)

52.8%

First

242

207

117

56.5%

25.5% (2.6) 27.2%

48

23.2%

66.7% (3.6)

63.6%

Second

838

786

404

51.4%

33.4% (1.6) 32.4%

707

89.9%

90.0% (1.3)

91.7%

Third

765

679

107

15.8%

11.6% (1.7) 13.9%

603

88.8%

90.7% (1.5)

89.1%

Fourth

1688

1520

225

14.8%

9.2% (2.2)

10.5%

1373

90.3%

93.7% (1.6)

93.4%

Fifth

1706

1613

418

25.9%

19.4% (2.9) 16.4%

1385

85.9%

91.3% (3.2)

91.0%

Sixth

927

821

231

28.1%

13.8% (1.3) 12.0%

694

84.5%

90.0% (2.2)

92.6%

Seventh

605

528

291

55.1%

37.2% (4.2) 37.5%

249

47.2%

65.9% (2.3)

65.2%

Eighth

733

686

187

27.3%

16.7% (1.1) 15.5%

405

59.0%

77.0% (2.1)

78.2%

Ninth

2563

2420

755

31.2%

21.4% (1.8) 20.6%

2195

90.7%

93.0% (0.4)

93.3%

Tenth

573

513

141

27.5%

26.2% (3.1) 27.9%

407

79.3%

81.3% (2.5)

78.5%

Eleventh

1136

1039

194

18.7%

10.2% (1.5) 10.4%

937

90.2%

93.3% (1.2)

93.9%

TOTAL

12104

11065

3204

29.0%

9140

82.6%

82.6% (12.2)

88.2%

22.6%
(11.6)

18.8%

1 These means were generated using Table B-10 in Judicial Business for each
year between 2015 and 2020. See also McAlister, Rebuilding, supra note 3, at 1177
tbl.4 (using same). “SD” refers to the standard deviation for each mean.
2 JUDICIAL BUSINESS 2017 tbl.B-10.
3 These means were generated using Table B-12 in Judicial Business for each
year between 2015 and 2020. See also McAlister, Rebuilding, supra note 3, at 1176
tbl.3 (using same). “SD” refers to the standard deviation for each mean.
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